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vRE´SUME´
Les protocoles se´curite´ RFID sont des sous-ensembles des protocoles cryptographiques
mais avec des fonctions cryptographiques le´ge`res. Leur objectif principal est l’identification
a` l’e´gard de certaines proprie´te´s de intimite´ comme la non-trac¸abilite´ et la confidentialite´ de
l’avant. La intimite´ est un point essentielle de la socie´te´ d’aujourd’hui. Un protocole d’iden-
tification RFID devrait non seulement permettre a` un lecteur le´gitime d’authentifier un tag,
mais il faut aussi prote´ger la intimite´ du tag. Des failles de se´curite´ ont e´te´ de´couvertes dans
la plupart de ces protocoles, en de´pit de la quantite´ conside´rable de temps et d’efforts requis
pour la conception et la mise en œuvre de protocoles cryptographiques. La responsabilite´ de
la ve´rification ade´quate devient cruciale.
Les me´thodes formelles peuvent jouer un roˆle essentiel dans le de´veloppement de proto-
coles de se´curite´ fiables. Les syste`mes critiques qui ne´cessitent une haute fiabilite´ tels que les
protocoles de se´curite´ sont difficiles a` e´valuer en utilisant les tests conventionnels et les tech-
niques de simulation. Cela a eu comme effet de concentrer les recherches sur les techniques de
ve´rification formelle de tels syste`mes pour assurer un degre´ e´leve´ de fiabilite´. Par conse´quent,
certaines recherches ont e´te´ faites dans ce domaine, mais une de´finition explicite de certaines
de ces proprie´te´s de se´curite´ n’ont pas encore e´te´ donne´e.
L’objectif principal de cette the`se est de de´montrer l’utilisation de me´thodes formelles
pour analyser les proprie´te´s de intimite´ du protocole RFID. Plusieurs de´finitions sont don-
ne´es dans la litte´rature pour les proprie´te´s non-trac¸abilite´, mais il n’y a pas d’accord sur
sa de´finition exacte. Nous avons introduit trois niveaux diffe´rents pour cette proprie´te´ en ce
qui concerne les expe´riences de intimite´ existantes. Nous avons e´galement classe´ toutes les
de´finitions existantes avec diffe´rents points forts de la proprie´te´ non-trac¸abilite´ dans la litte´-
rature. De plus, notre approche utilise spe´cifiquement les techniques de calculs de processus
pi calcul applique´s pour cre´er un mode`le pour un protocole. Nous de´montrons les de´finitions
formelles de nos niveaux de non-trac¸abilite´ propose´es et l’applique a` des e´tudes de cas sur les
protocoles existants.
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ABSTRACT
Radio Frequency IDentification (RFID) is the wireless non-contact use of radio-frequency
electromagnetic fields to transfer data, for the purposes of automatically identifying and
tracking tags attached to objects. Since RFID tags can be attached to clothing, possessions,
or even implanted within people, the possibility of reading personally-linked information
without consent has raised privacy concerns. Privacy is the essential part of today’s society.
RFID protocols are subsets of cryptographic protocols but with lightweight cryptographic
functions. Their main objective is identification with respect to some privacy properties, like
untraceability. An RFID identification protocol should not only allow a legitimate reader to
authenticate a tag but also it should protect the privacy of the tag. Although design and
implementation of cryptographic protocols are tedious and time consuming, security flaws
have been discovered in most of these protocols. Therefore the responsibility for reliable and
proper verification becomes crucial.
Formal methods can play an essential role in the development of reliable security proto-
cols. Critical systems which requires high reliability such as security protocols are difficult
to be evaluated using conventional tests and simulation techniques. This has encouraged the
researchers to focus on the formal verification techniques to ensure a high degree of reliability
in such systems. In spite of the studies which have been carried out in this field, an explicit
definition for some of these security properties is still missing.
The main goal of this work is to demonstrate the use of formal methods to analyse RFID
protocol’s untraceability. Untraceability generally defined as ensuring that an attacker can
not get any information to be used to trace an object in time and space. Several definitions
are discussed in the literature for untraceability property, however, there is no compromise on
its exact definition. We have introduced three different levels for this property. We also have
classified all former definitions of untraceability property in the literature. In order to create
a model for a protocol and define privacy properties, our approach employs process calculi
technique, applied pi calculus. We have demonstrated the formal definitions of suggested
untraceability levels, extending them to some case studies on the existing protocols.
Keywords: RFID security protocol, privacy, untraceability, formal method, process alge-
bra, applied pi.
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1CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
As we advance through the 21st century, it has been demonstrated that, RFID technology
will continue to grow and expand beyond our dreams. RFID systems are expected to become
more common and useful tools in most of the remote object identification systems. Because of
their low production costs and tiny size, they are currently deployed in many fields. Sensitive
informations, such as credit card numbers, passport informations, social security, medical in-
formation, pass everyday through the insecure wireless channel. Unfortunately, there is some
concerns within the use of RFID in view of the minimal privacy and security held. Privacy
and security have been defined in (Marcella et Stucki, 2003) as, “when and with whom you
share your personal information,” and “how well information is protected from unauthorized
access, alteration, or destruction.”
The security and privacy objectives of so many systems have not been met. The compu-
tational limitations of RFID tags impose significant restrictions on the number and type of
cryptographic primitives that can be implemented on them. Nonetheless, widespread deploy-
ment of these tags and also the contactlessness of communication bring up new threats to the
user privacy. As an example, a tag can be embedded in a credit card or a passport which is
linked to the person’s identity,. In this case, the tracking of a tag turns into the tracking of a
person. Chotia and Smirnov studied on privacy attacks on e-passports (Chothia et Smirnov,
2010), illustrating that, it is possible to trace the displacement of particular passport, without
breaking the cryptographic functions.
This thesis will help the private design of RFID protocols and facilitate the analysis of
existing schemes through the particular focus on untraceability property. Untraceability is
one of the most important privacy properties which must be respected by an RFID system.
We would consider the protocols private, if privacy requirement could not be violated by any
adversary. Although, these properties are mostly used in the context of RFID systems, they
are issues for any protocol, which is applied by a mobile device.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: RFID systems will be introduced
(Section 1.1). A brief description of cryptographic protocols will be revealed (Section 1.2)
and their security properties will be discussed (Section 1.3). Formal approaches for protocol
2verification techniques will be investigated in (Section 1.4). The Problem statement will be
notified (Section 1.5). The objectives of this thesis and the description of the contribution
will be presented (Section 1.6). Finally, an overview of the structure will be summarised
(Section 1.7).
1.1 RFID Systems
RFID is a system that transmits the identity (in the form of a unique serial number) of
an object wirelessly, using radio waves. It’s grouped under the broad category of automatic
identification technologies. Auto-ID technologies include bar codes, optical character read-
ers and some biometric technologies, such as retinal scans. The auto-ID technologies have
been used to reduce the amount of time and labour needed to input data manually, like bar
code systems, and to improve data accuracy. Some auto-ID technologies, such as bar code
systems, often require a person to manually scan a label or tag to capture the data. RFID
is designed to enable readers to capture data on tags and transmit it to a computer system
without needing a person to be involved.
The beginnings of RFID technology can be traced back to work carried out during World
War II on radar technology. In particular, an ancestor of modern RFID is the so-called
Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) system, first introduced in second world war and still in use to-
day to identify friendly or enemy aircraft. IFF, as used by the British Air Force at that time,
was what we would describe today as a programmable tag that upon interrogation would
return a code that identified the aircraft that carried it as friendly. Early IFF systems were
further developed in the 1950s and nowadays are in common use in civil as well as military
aviation.
Figure 1.1 Overview of an RFID system
An RFID system, as shown in Figure 1.1 is composed of three main components, a tag
3(transponder), a reader (transceiver) and the reader’s back-end database. A tag typically
has a microchip to store basic information (ID, manufacturer’s info) and an antenna for
transmitting signals to RFID reader. A reader can interrogate a tag by sending a signal
via electro-magnetic fields. The tag receives the signal through its antenna and responds
with information stored on its microchip, which is verified by the reader against its back-end
database. Although RFID systems are used as one of the most pervasive computing technolo-
gies, there are still so many security issues that need to be solved before their vast deployment.
This technology poses critical privacy and security concerns (Chothia et Smirnov, 2010). In
an RFID system, it is mostly supposed that the communication channel between a reader and
its back-end database is via secured wired channel while the channel between a reader and
a tag is wireless and insecure. Therefore studying the communication between the database
and the readers is not relevant. Hence, readers and database are often considered as a single
and unique entity in the security analysis.
Figure 1.2 Two samples of RFID Applications: Access Control & Supply chain
The use of RFID in society attracts lots of attention in the past few years because of its
beneficial features. The most well known application of the RFID tag is the supply chain and
logistics. RFID tags can be attached to the objects in a supply chain to track, secure and
manage goods throughout the entire production cycle. The overall cost of the supply chain
could be reduced by using low cost tags and also adopting high-efficiency bulk-processing and
non-human-intervention method. (Sarac et al., 2010; Khashkhashi Moghaddam et al., 2012).
RFID chips can also be embedded into passports to record the holder’s biometric information
such as fingerprint and iris data (Kumar et Srinivasan, 2012). Some 95 countries, including
the Canada and the United States have been using e-passports for several years (Passport
Canada). RFID tags also can be a key and used in access control systems. They can store
personal information for security check-ins. For example, an employee carries an ID card,
embedded with a RFID chip, could authenticate his or her identity at the security entry in
a facility very fast (Xiang, 2012). RFID system also has been used in a other industries like
4automatic payment systems, medical systems, animal tracking, libraries and smart appliances
(Fosso, 2012; Wamba, 2012; Kushal et al., 2012).
Different kind of tags are used in different places. Tags can be divided into three main
types. Passive tags, which do not require batteries, can be much smaller, and have an
unlimited life span. They are currently being developed by several companies globally. These
tags are much less expensive than other types. Passive tags receive all power from the reader
and necessarily cannot initiate any communications. Semi-passive tags are very similar to
passive tags except for the addition of a small battery. This battery allows the tag to be
constantly powered. Therefore, semi-passive tags are faster in response than passive, though
less reliable and powerful than active tags. Active tags have their own internal power source,
which is used to power tag to generate the outgoing signal. They are typically much more
reliable (e.g. fewer errors) than passive tags due to the ability for active tags to conduct a
”session”with a reader. Due to their on-board power supply, also transmitting at higher power
levels than passive tags, allows them to be more effective in ”RF challenged” environments
like water, heavy metal (shipping containers, vehicles), or at longer distances. Any active
tags have practical ranges of hundreds of meters. Table 1.1 depicts the main characteristic
of each group.
Table 1.1 Tag Classification
Property
Type
Passive Semi-Passive Active
Frequency(MHz) 860-960 868-915 and 2.4GHz 860-960 and 2.4GHz
Internal Power No Yes Yes
Bit Rate(kbps) 246 16 20/40/250
Read Range(m) 10 30 100
Cost(cents) 10-150 500-2000 1250-2500
1.2 Cryptographic Protocols
A security protocol also called a cryptographic protocol is a communication protocol
that performs security functions while applying cryptographic methods. Participants to a
protocol, called agents, have to follow some steps, known in advance, to communicate with
each other.
Cryptographic techniques are used for the protocols with a security objective. The security
objective might be confidentiality or might involve authentication, generation of random
sequences, or partial sharing of a secret. Since the communication medium in RFID systems
5is public, the messages in the wireless channels can be eavesdropped by any adversary with
the receiver equipment. An adversary may interface and even intercept, insert, block, modify
the messages in the wireless channel. This has made the design of secure protocols difficult.
Using cryptographic protocols is one of the solutions to overcome security threats in RFID
systems. Because of the resource limitation of RFID tags, it requires lots of efforts to find
a light weight and secure protocol. Therefore simple and light weight cryptographic oper-
ations like logical operations(e.g. XOR, AND, OR) mostly used in these protocols. Many
researchers have looked into the problem in order to design protocols which allow authorised
persons to identify the tags without an adversary being able to trace them. Numerous papers
addressing RFID cryptographic protocols have been published recently such as (Wang et al.,
2012; Bassil et al., 2012; Qi et al., 2012; Sun et Zhong, 2012; Lee, 2012; Jia et Wen, 2012).
Many works have used cryptographic primitives to encrypt the secrets like tag identifier.
Hash function-based protocols like (Lee et al., 2006; Henrici et Mu¨ller, 2004; Ohkubo et al.,
2003) are taking the advantage of one-way function to prevent direct exposure of secret. For
example authors in (Ohkubo et al., 2003) used two different hash functions, one for sending
tag’s internal state to the reader and the other for updating the tag’s secret. In addition,
Henrici in (Henrici et Mu¨ller, 2004) proposed a scheme that all the data management is done
in back-end and the tag only requires a hash function. Therefore the communication channel
does not need to be reliable and the reader need not be trusted and also no long-term secrets
stored in tags. Later Dimitriou in (Dimitriou, 2006) presented an optimized scheme using
hash functions, which do not require exhaustive search in the back-end database. Pseudonym
Random Function (PRF) has also been used in the design of RFID protocols. For exapmle in
(Tsudik, 2006), author presented an algorithm called YATRAP which needs only the secret
ID and a Pseudo Random Number Generator (PRNG). Later Chatmon et al. (Chatmon
et al., 2006) presented YA-TRAP+ and OTRAP.
Most of these schemes are 3-round identification protocols as depicted in Figure 1.3. The
first message is the starting request or may contain data such as a nonce. Nonce is an arbitrary
number used only once in a cryptographic communication. The main part of the protocol lies
on the information in the second message which changes at each new identification. It could
be either the tag’s identifier, or an encrypted version of its identifier. The third message is
not used for the identification of the tag but it may be used by the tag to update its identifier.
Within this thesis we will represent protocols graphically using message sequence charts.
Every message sequence chart shows a reader role R and a tag role T with the role names
framed, on the top of the chart. Above the role names, the role’s secret terms are shown.
6Figure 1.3 3-Round Identification Protocol
Events, such as nonce generation, computation, and assignments are shown in boxes. Mes-
sages to be sent and expected to be received are specified above arrows connecting the roles.
It is assumed that an agent continues the execution of its run only if it receives a message
conforming to the specification.
1.3 Security Properties
Cryptographic protocols are required to satisfy some security requirements also called
security properties. Depending on the protocol’s purpose, failure to preserve security prop-
erties may result in unveiling confidential information to an intruder and consequently, may
lead to protocol failure. These includes classical properties like secrecy and authentication or
privacy properties like anonymity or untraceability. These requirements must be overcome
to consider a protocol secure against the threats.
Secrecy and authentication are the two basic standard requirements of any authenti-
cation protocol. To define secrecy informally, we could say that a protocol P preserves the
secrecy of data M if P never publishes M , or anything that would permit the computation of
M , even in interaction with an adversary. In addition to the secrecy, an authentication pro-
tocol should also enable an agent to prove her identity. Recalling the client-server handshake
protocol, authentication ensures that the client C is only willing to share her secret with the
server S; it follows that, if she completes the protocol, then she believes she has done so with
S and hence authentication of S to C should hold. In contrast, server S is willing to run the
protocol with the client C who he is willing to, and hence at the end of the protocol he only
expects authentication of C to S to hold, if he believes C was indeed his interlocutor.
In addition to secrecy and authentication, there are other properties which could be
7conisdered as the main issue in RFID systems rather than other communication systems.
An RFID authentication protocol should not only allow a legitimate reader to authenticate
a tag but it should also protect the privacy of the tag. Here, we present the main privacy
properties which are generally required for RFID protocols.
Anonymity allows an entity to make transactions that cannot be known by others. If
the tag ID can be kept anonymous, the problem of leaking information pertaining to the
user belongings would be solved. Anonymity is the topic of most researches. This property
is highly important for tag owner privacy in the environment. It is informally defined by
the ISO/IEC standard 15408 as ensuring that a user may use a service or resource without
disclosing the user’s identity.
Figure 1.4 Anonymity
Intuitively, it says that an attacker cannot discern the tag from any information that the
owner necessarily reveals during the identification. This might include nonces or keys which
the tag owner is given during the protocol. Figure 1.4 shows the RFID tag anonymity.
Untraceability says that an attacker cannot trace the movement of a tag. RFID readers
in strategic locations can record sightings of unique tag identifiers, which are then associated
with personal identities. Passive tags respond to readers without alerting their owners when
they powered by electromagnetic waves from a reader. The threat comes out when a tag
identifier linked to personal information. For example, by using a credit card or an e-passport,
if an attacker can establish a link between a person’s identity and the tags he is carrying, at
any such point the tracing of objects can become the tracing of a person.
Let’s Consider set of messages sent by different agents, for example in a communication
system, all messages sent by the same sender are related to each other for him but should not
for an attacker. Untraceability as first defined by Avoine (Avoine et Oechslin, 2005) means
that an attacker can not get any information to be used to trace an object in time and space.
Figure 1.5 shows the concept of untraceability in a simple manner.
8Figure 1.5 Untraceability
Comparing with anonymity, in analysing untraceability the identity of the tag is not im-
portant, the point is that the link between different sessions of the tags cannot be established
by an attacker. In this sense, untraceability is not intended to protect the link between a tag
participated in the protocol and the identity of the user, but rather the link between different
sessions of the tags.
Forward Secrecy ensures that even by compromising a tag at some later time, an adver-
sary can not link the tag to its previous sessions. In other word she cannot trace the data
back through past events in which the tag was involved. For example once the secret in the
tag is stolen, all past activities can be traced by searching past logs. So the past activities
should be protected from tampering. For forward privacy, the attacker is allowed to tamper
with a tag and retrieve the data stored in it. We call a protocol forward secure if the attacker
cannot use the obtained data to link the tag to past sessions. It requires that the adversary
who only eavesdrops on the tag output, cannot associate the current output with past output.
In other words given set of observations between tags and readers and given the fact that
all information stored in the involved tags has been revealed at time t, the adversary must
not be able to find any relation between any observations of the same tag or a set of tags
that occurred at time t´ < t. It is depicted in Figure 1.6.
Figure 1.6 Forward Secrecy
91.4 Formal Verification of Security Protocols
Critical systems which require high reliability such as aircraft navigation systems, banking
transactions, security protocols and other similar systems are difficult to be evaluated using
conventional test and simulation techniques. Unlike testing that does not provide exhaustive
coverage, verification using model checking gives a more thorough analysis of the system by
checking satisfiability of the requirement through every branch of the model representing the
system. It covers all possible scenarios of the behavior of the system. Formal verification
techniques used in such systems to ensure a high degree of reliability. (Siminiceanu et Ciardo,
2012; Ahamad et al., 2012; Souyris et al., 2009)
Formal methods have proven to be a promising technique toward developing automated
and generic protocol verification and testing methods. The main benefits of formal verification
comparing to testing, is its soundness and exhaustiveness.
1.4.1 Formal Methods
Formal methods, as defined by Meadows (see Meadows, 2003), combine a language which
can be used to model a cryptographic protocol and its security properties. It means the
use of mathematical and logical techniques to express the system and its properties. By
building a mathematically rigorous model of such a system and a mathematical definition of
the properties, it is possible to verify the system’s properties in a more thorough fashion than
empirical testing. With these techniques, we can develop specifications and models, which
describe all or part of a system’s behavior at various levels of abstraction, and use them as
input to an automated model checker. Formal methods in context of cryptographic protocols
generally divided into two parts: Formal modelling of the protocol specification and Formal
verification which refers to analysis of the security properties.
Although cryptographic protocols design is improving day by the day but there are still
some security issues that are discovered mostly as the result of an informal approach. For-
mal methods successfully applied to find such problems. Many formal techniques and tools
have been developed to reason about security and protocols. Probably the first mention of
formal methods as a possible tool for cryptographic protocol analysis came in Needham and
Schroeder (see Needham et Schroeder, 1978). However, the first work that was actually done
in this area was done by Dolev and Yao (Dolev et Yao, 1983).
Modelling a cryptographic protocol begins with specification of the protocol and its
requirements. Specification language could be a formal language or calculi. Milner’s Pi-
calculus(Milner, 1991) is a general-purpose calculus that has been successfully used to demon-
strate security properties for some protocols. By extending it with specialized cryptographic
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primitives, Abadi obtained what he called the SPI calculus (Abadi et Gordon, 1997), a pro-
cess algebra specifically designed for modelling cryptographic protocols (Abadi et Gordon,
1997), which allows verification of a broader spectrum of security protocols, as the encryp-
tion and decryption can now be checked. Since we used applied pi calculus as our modelling
language, we will present the preliminaries of this language in chapter 2.
1.4.2 Verification Techniques for Cryptographic protocols
Generally formal verification techniques in context of cryptographic protocols divided into
three main categories: Logic oriented methods, Model checking and Theorem proving.
Logic oriented methods
This method uses the modal logics to specify and analyse cryptographic protocols. Modal
logic is a type of formal logic primarily developed in the 1960s that extends classical propo-
sitional and predicate logic to include operators expressing modality. They reason about
the evolution of knowledge and beliefs within a system to show that certain conditions are
satisfied. The basic idea of these approaches is the analysis of knowledge or belief during the
protocol run. Inference rules are used to describe how beliefs or knowledge can be derived
from other beliefs or knowledges.
The most famous in the class of logics is the Burrows–Abadi–Needham (BAN) logic (see
Burrows et al., 1989). It models messages and the beliefs of an agent. BAN logic is a set of
rules for defining and analysing information exchange protocols. It is an example of a logic of
belief, which consists of a set of modal operators describing the relationship of principals to
data, a set of possible beliefs that can be held by principals (such as a belief that a message
was sent by a certain other principal), and a set of inference rules for deriving new beliefs
from old ones. Specifically, it helps its users determine whether exchanged information is
trustworthy, secured against eavesdropping, or both. Note that belief logics such as BAN
are generally weaker than state exploration tools since they operate at a much higher level
of abstraction.
There are a numbers of others including Bieber’s CKT5 (Bieber, 1990), Syverson’s KPL
(Syverson, 1990) and Protocol Composition Logic (PCL) (Datta et al., 2005).
Model checking
Model checking (Clarke, 1997) is one of the most common formal verification techniques.
Model refers to the mathematical representation of the system and using model checking
technique a temporal logic formula besides the model of your system can determine whether
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the model satisfies the property or not. The basic idea is an automated method to determine
the correctness property holds by exploring the state space of a model. If the property does
not hold in each state, the model checking algorithm produces a counterexample and an
execution trace leads to a state in which the property is violated. For models with a small
state space this search can be exhaustive and the results are then equivalent to a formal
proof. Since the state space might be too large to be examined directly, model checking is
typically combined with abstraction techniques.
The inputs to the model checker are, a finite-state model M , a model that represents all
possible scenarios of the behaviour of a system S, and a property P to be checked in every
state of M . The model checker exhaustively explores all the paths through M while checking
that P is true at each reachable state. If no branch in the model violates this property then
the system is said to satisfy the property. Otherwise, the verifier outputs the branch that
has violated the property, known as the counterexample.
Two general approaches to model checking are used: Explicit state enumeration and
Symbolic model checking. In the first, the states of the system under verification are basically
encoded and stored in a table and then checked against the desired properties. Many state
reduction techniques have been developed to help reduce the state space without affecting
the ability of the tool to discover insecure states. Other techniques are also used in order
to optimize both the search and storage procedures. The second approach, symbolic model
checking (Meadows et Meadows, 1995) brought some remedy to the state space explosion
problem of model checking and is based on the use of Ordered Binary Decision Diagram
(OBDD)s. Using OBDDs allows for an efficient representation of system state transition,
thereby increasing the size of the system that could be verified. By using symbolic model
checking, it is possible to verify extremely large reactive systems. This is possible because the
number of nodes in the OBDDs that must be constructed no longer depends on the actual
number of states or the size of the transition relation. Because of this breakthrough it is now
possible to verify reactive systems with realistic complexity.
The most works on state machine approaches goes back to Dolev and Yao (Dolev et Yao,
1983). A Finite State Machine (FSM) includes a finite number of states and produces output
on state transitions after receiving an input symbol. It is often used to model control portion
of a protocol. In these models a state space is defined and then explored by the tool to
determine if there are any paths through the space corresponding to a successful attack by
the intruder. Much of this work was successful in finding flaws in protocols that had been
previously undetected by human analysts. One of the first systems that used Dolev-Yao
approach is Interrogator developed by Millen (Millen et al., 1987). The tool attempts to
locate protocol security flaws by an exhaustive search of the state space. In this class we
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can also mention NRL that is proposed by Meadows (Meadows, 1996). It is also based on
the Dolev-Yao approach and use the similar strategy as Interrogator. Other researches has
also focused on state exploration such as MurΦ (Mitchell et al., 1997), Maude (Denker et al.,
1998), SATMC (SAT-based Model-Checker) (Armando et al., 2003) or FDR (Lowe, 1996).
The most significant problem of this kind of methods is that the search space of the paths to
find the insecure state can be infinite which leads to a termination problem.
Theorem proving
This techniques model the computations performed in a protocol and define security
properties as theorem, automated theorem checkers are then used to verify these theorems
and thus prove properties of the model. Automated theorem proving is the oldest technique
of formal verification, and it has been studied and practised since the 1960s. The logic is
given by a formal system based on a set of axioms and inference rules. Theorem proving is
the process of finding proofs using axioms of the system. The idea is to represent two models
or properties as two formulas f and g in a reasonably expressive logic, consequently prove
that f ⇒ g (Pradhan et Harris, 2009).
Theorem provers are being used more and more in the mechanical verification of safety
critical properties of hardware and software designs. Logic based proofs for security protocols
build on traditional mathematical reasoning, using models extended for representing security
concepts. Logical notations typically offer a wide range of data structures and operators
which makes them capable of accurately representing the messages transmitted in security
protocols. Unfortunately, a particular weakness of logic-based models is that they have no
in-built notions of communication concepts such as message sequencing and these must be
explicitly expressed in the model. Paulson in (Paulson, 1994) used the theorem prover Isabelle
to analyze protocols.
In contrast to model checking, theorem proving can be applied to systems with infinite
state spaces because it doesn’t have the state space exploration problem. It also relies on
techniques such as structural induction to prove over infinite domains. As a disadvantage to
this technique, we can point that interactive theorem provers, require human interaction, so
the theorem proving process is slow and sometimes error prone.
1.4.3 Adversary Model
In security scenarios typically we assume that cryptographic protocols should achieve their
objectives in the presence of a malicious entity that seeks to break the security of the system,
called adversary. The characterization of the adversary is essentially done by specifying the
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actions that she is allowed to perform (i.e. the oracles she can query), the goal of her attack
(i.e. the game she plays) and the way in which she can interact with the system (i.e. the
rules of the game).
Consider a public-key cryptosystem including a plaintext x underlying a challenge ci-
phertext y. The classic attacks in order of increasing strength are chosen-plaintext attacks
(CPA), non-adaptive chosen-ciphertext attacks (CCA1), and adaptive chosen-ciphertext at-
tacks (CCA2) (Naor et Yung, 1990). Under CPA, the adversary has the capability to choose
arbitrary plaintexts to be encrypted and obtain the corresponding ciphertexts. For example,
in the public-key setting, giving the adversary the public key suffices to capture these attacks.
Under CCA1, the adversary gets, in addition to the public key, access to an oracle for the
decryption function. The adversary may use this decryption function only for the period
of time preceding her being given the challenge ciphertext y. Under CCA2, the adversary
again gets (in addition to the public key) access to an oracle for the decryption function, but
this time she may use this decryption function even on ciphertexts chosen after obtaining
the challenge ciphertext y, the only restriction being that the adversary may not ask for the
decryption of y itself (Rackoff et Simon, 1992).
For RFID systems, no universal adversary model has been defined yet, up until now
designs and attacks have been made in an ad hoc way. Even though there are concepts
like CPA, CCA1 and CCA2 for confidentiality, in RFID systems the adversaries resources
are defined in an ad hoc manner and vary depending on the publication. They can be
passive, active but limited in the number of queries on the tag, active but cannot modify
exchange between the legitimate tag and a reader or active but cannot tamper with the tags.
For example Avoine defined the adversary as a Probabilistic Polynomially-bounded Turing
Machine(PPTM) (Avoine, 2005), which interacts with RFID tags and readers through some
oracles. Vaudenay (Vaudenay, 2007) also proposed a hierarchical model for adversary. His
model captures eight classes of adversary capabilities ranging over four different types of
tag corruption and two modes of observation. There are also other works in modelling the
adversary in RFID systems like (Canard et al., 2010; Cai et al., 2012)
In this dissertation we consider the adversary model described by Dolev and Yao (Dolev et
Yao, 1983). It is based on its initial knowledge which is extended by observing the communi-
cations. Since the adversary has complete control of the network in this model, it is assumed
that the adversary has unlimited inference capabilities and messages may be read, modified,
deleted or injected. It means that she has the ability to influence all communications between
a tag and the reader, she can change the order of messages, combine the information in his
knowledge to construct or interpret new terms and can therefore perform man-in-the-middle
attacks on any tag that is within its range. In brief Dolev-Yao adversary is as follows:
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• Eavesdrop all messages transmitted on the network
• Replay to captured messages
• Inject new messages deduced from captured messages
• Intercept messages
However, these capabilities are restricted due to the assumption of perfect cryptography.
This means that the adversary cannot reverse hash functions and that she is not able to learn
the contents of an encrypted term, unless she knows the decryption key.
1.5 Problem Statement
The contactlessness of communication and the expected ubiquity of RFID systems en-
courage nefarious entities to track and analyze tags in time and space. If at any such point
a tag is linked to an individual, the tracking of a tag becomes the tracking of a person. The
need for RFID protocols to be secured against these threats has been realized early on (Juels,
2006; Breu, 2011). A number of papers discussed about the untraceability problems, raised
by RFID technologies and its importance, however, very few defined a formal model and the
untraceability property precisely.
In the literature, there are several definitions of untraceability, while there is no agree-
ment on its comprehensive definition. Generally two type of models have been considered
in order to formalize untraceability; The Symbolic model and Computational model. Most
of the definitions have been accomplished in computational settings. These experiments are
poorly supported by automatic tools. In the symbolic world, in one hand Arapinis defined
the notions of weak and strong untraceability in the process algebra (Arapinis et al., 2009),
on the other hand, Bruso defined a single definition for untraceability (Bruso´ et al., 2010). By
investigating the existing models we found that, there are some cases that make it impossible
to satisfy the defined properties, or the definitions are not complied properly with some type
of protocols. All the above models will be fully presented in the related works. Therefore,
the need to sum up and classify all these definitions is essential.
These problems made us to think of studying the former definitions, providing more clear
and explicit definitions for untraceability with different strength levels. Finally a solution is
proposed for the automatic analysis of untraceaility of protocols.
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1.6 Research Objectives
1.6.1 Research Question
• How to formalize and automatically verify untraceability of RFID protocols?
1.6.2 General Objective
The main idea of this thesis is to provide the design of private cryptographic protocols
and facilitate the privacy evaluation of existing schemes, using formal verification techniques.
This thesis presents an approach for modelling and verifying privacy property, particularly
in RFID identification protocols. Our work is an attempt to the formal analysis of a more
challenging privacy property in RFID protocols, so-called untraceability. Thus, by proving
untraceability in an RFID protocol, it prevents a real world attacker to invalidate the protocol,
making it impossible to trace a tag, and hence its owner as well.
1.6.3 Specific Objectives
• Establish different strength levels for untraceability properties
• Formalize untraceability properties using applied pi calculus
• Classify all existing definitions of untraceability in the literature
• Automatic Verification of untraceability in RFID protocols
1.6.4 Original Scientific Hypothesis of our Contribution(OSHC)
Hypothesis:
• Verifying untraceability in each proposed levels for any RFID protocol, prevents an
adversary invalidate the untraceability of modelled protocol.
Justification of originality : Few researches have looked at formalizing untraceability in
symbolic settings. Providing explicit definitions for different levels of untraceability in pro-
cess algebra, considering the game based definitions in computational setting has not been
provided in any research.
Refutability : The hypothesis will be refuted if an adversary can interfere the privacy of
the protocol which satisfied our untraceability levels.
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1.7 Outline of the Thesis
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 introduces the syntax and semantics of the language of our symbolic setting:
applied pi calculus.
• Chapter 3 surveys the related works in the application of formal methods to the analysis
of untraceability in RFID protocols. Discussion about symbolic and computational
settings will be presented in this chapter.
• Chapter 4 begins with classifying existing privacy games. Then we will propose our
levels of untraceability related to the former games. After that we will presents our
protocol model and formalization of proposed untraceability levels based on applied
pi calculus. Finally we will compare all existing definitions of untraceability in the
literature and provide a classification of this property.
• Chapter 5 includes some case studies which describe the results of verifying the RFID
identification protocols from the implementation using proposed framework. Three
existing RFID protocols will be modelled. Finally Verification results will be demon-
strated.
• Chapter 6 summarizes the work presented and underlines our original contributions.
We will also explain the limitations of the work and future improvements in this chapter.
Finally, the Bibliography section lists all the articles, reports, books and etc.
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CHAPTER 2
BACKGROUND: APPLIED PI CALCULUS
The applied pi calculus is a process calculi, a mathematical formalism for describing and
analysing concurrent systems and their interactions. It is an extension of the pi calculus
(Milner, 1999) with the addition of a rich term algebra, value-passing, primitive function
symbols and equational theory to enable modelling of the cryptographic operations used
by security protocols. It is specifically targeted at modelling security protocols by adding
the possibility to model wide variety of complex cryptographic primitives, including, non-
deterministic encryption, digital signatures, and proofs of knowledge, while the pi calculus
has a fixed set of primitives built-in like symmetric and public key encryption. Symbolic
model relies on Dolev-Yao model(Dolev et Yao, 1983) in which messages are modelled as
algebraic terms instead of computational model. The applied pi calculus permits formal
modelling of properties including: reachability, correspondence and observational equivalence.
In the context of cryptographic protocols, these properties are particularly useful, since they
allow the analysis of traditional security goals such as secrecy and authentication. Moreover,
emerging properties such as privacy and traceability can also be considered. Here we briefly
recall its basic notions, for an extended descriptions see (Abadi et Fournet, 2001).
2.1 Syntax and Informal Semantics
The calculus consists of terms including infinite set of names(a, b, c, . . .), variables(x, y, z)
and a signature Σ consisting of a finite set of function symbols each with an associated ar-
ity(e.g. one-way hash functions, encryption, digital signatures and data structures as pairing),
plain processes and extended processes.
Definition 2.1. (Algebraic Term) The set T (Σ) of algebraic terms is the smallest set defined
by the grammer of table 2.1
Table 2.1 Syntax for terms
L,M,N, T, U, V ::= terms
a, b, c, . . . , k, . . . ,m, n, . . . , s names
x, y, z variables
f(M1, . . . ,Mar) function application
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where f rages over the functions of Σ and ar matches the arity of f . A function symbol
with arity 0 is called constant, with arity 1 is called unary and with arity 2 is called binary.
Metavariables such as u, v, w are used to denote both names and variables. Tuples u1, . . . , uar
and M1, . . . ,Mar are abbreviated to u˜ and M˜ respectively. We assume a type system for terms
generated by a set of base types such as Integer, Key, or simply a universal type, Data. In
addition if τ is a type, then Channel(τ) is a type too. Typically a,b, and c are used for
channel names, s and k as names of some base types, and m and n as names of any type. We
always assume that terms are well-typed and the substitutions preserves types.
Definition 2.2. (Ground Term) A term is called ground or closed if it contains no variables,
and it is denoted by TΣ.
Example 2.3. Let a be a constant, f be a unary function and g be a binary function. The
ground terms that could be built by above signature are like followings:
a f(a) g(a, a) g(f(a), f(a)) f(g(a, a)) . . .
In the applied pi calculus, one has plain processes and extended processes. The grammar
for processes is similar to the pi calculus, except that messages can contain terms (rather
than just names) and that names need not be just channel names. The syntax of process is
shown below:
Table 2.2 Syntax for processes
P,Q,R ::= processes (or plain processes)
0 null process
P |Q parallel composition
!P replication
νn.P name restriction
if M = N then P else Q conditional
u(x).P message input(also written as in(u, x).P )
u¯〈M〉.P message output (also written as out(u, x).P )
let x = g(M1, . . . ,Mn) in P else Q destructor application
let x = M in P binding
The null process 0 does nothing; P |Q is the parallel composition of process P and Q
to represent the agents of the protocol running in parallel; the replication !P behaves as
an infinite composition of P running in parallel (P |P | . . .) which mostly used to show the
unbounded number of protocol sessions. The name restriction νn.P makes a new, private
name n inside P which is often used to represent nonces, keys, private channels and other
fresh random numbers. The conditional construct if M = N then P else Q is standard, but
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M = N represents equality rather than strict syntactic identity. If Q is a null process we can
abbreviate it to if M = N then P . Finally, the communication between agents is shown by
message input and message output. The process u(x).P is ready to input from channel u,
then to run P with the received message replaced with parameter x, while u¯〈M〉.P is ready
to output M on channel u, then to run P . In both of these, the P is omitted when it is a
null process. The set of free names in P , denoted fn(P ), consists of those names n occurring
in P not in the scope of a restriction νx or input u(x). In opposite, The set of bound names
bn(P ) contains every name n which is not in free in P .
Further, the processes are extended with active substitutions:
Table 2.3 Syntax for extended processes
A,B,C ::= extended processes
P plain process
A|B parallel composition
νn.A name restriction
νx.A variable restriction
{M/x} active substitution
Processes are extended with active substitution to take into account the knowledge ex-
posed to the adversarial environment and reflect in its interaction with the protocol. The
active substitution {M/x} denotes the substitution that replaces the variable x with the
term M in every process. In other words M is available to the environment but the variable
x is just a way to refer to M . This allows access to terms which the environment cannot
construct. Although the substitution {M/x} concerns only one variable, large substitution
can be written as: {M1/x1, . . . ,Mar/xar} or {M˜/x˜}.
Contexts may be used to represent the adversarial environment in which a process is run;
that environment provides the data that the process inputs, and consumes the data that it
outputs. A context C [ ] is an expression (a process or extended process) with a hole. C [P ]
is obtained as the result of filling C [ ]’s hole with P . An evaluation context C [ ] is a context
whose hole is not under a replication, a conditional, an input, or an output.
Active substitutions are useful because they allow us to map an extended process A to
its frame ϕ(A) by replacing every plain process in A with 0. A frame, denoted ϕ or ψ, is
an extended process built from 0 and active substitution {M/x}; The frame ϕ(A) represents
the static knowledge exposed by a process A to its environment. The domain dom(ϕ) of a
frame ϕ is the set of the variables that ϕ exports.
Example 2.4. We are now able to model processes of the applied pi calculus. As an example
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consider the following processes:
P = c(x).if x = req then c¯〈hello〉 else 0
This process waits for a message on the public channel c. If the received message is req,
then the process sends hello on the public channel c.
2.2 Operational Semantics
Operational semantics of the applied pi calculus are defined by the means of two relations:
structural equivalence and internal reductions.
2.2.1 Structural Equivalence
Informally, two processes are structurally equivalent if they model the same thing, but
the grammar permits different encodings. For example, to describe a pair of processes A,B
running in parallel, the grammar forces us to put one on the left and one on the right; that
is, we have to write either A|B, or B|A. These two processes are said to be structurally
equivalent.
Definition 2.5. (α-Conversion) is renaming a bound name or variable without changing the
semantics.
Definition 2.6. (Structural equivalence ≡) is the smallest equivalence relation on extended
processes that is closed under α-conversion of both bound names and variables and application
of evaluation contexts which satisfies the rules in table 2.4.
Table 2.4 Semantics for processes (1)
A|0 ≡ A νn.0 ≡ 0
A|(B|C) ≡ (A|B)|C νu.νw.A ≡ νw.νu.A
A|B ≡ B|A A|νu.B ≡ νu.(A|B)
!P ≡ P |!P if u /∈ fn(A) ∪ fv(A)
νx.{M/x} ≡ 0 {M/x} ≡ {N/x}
{M/x}|A ≡ {M/x}|A{M/x} if M =E N
The parallel composition, replication and restriction rules are self-explanatory. We briefly
describe the substitution rules here. The rule νx.{Mupslopex} ≡ 0 called ALIAS, enables us
to introduce active substitutions with restricted scopes. The second rule, {M/x}|A ≡
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{M/x}|A{M/x} called SUBST, describes the active substitution to a process. The final rule
called REWRITE, allows terms that are equal modulo the equational theory to be swapped.
Example 2.7. Consider the following process:
P ≡ νs.νk. (c¯1〈enc(s, k)〉|c1(y).c¯2〈dec(y, k)〉)
The first component publishes the message enc(s, k) on channel c1. The second receives
a message from channel c1, then using the secret key k decrypt it and sends the result on
channel c2. This process is structurally equivalent to the following extended process A:
A ≡ νs.νk.νx. (c¯1〈x〉|c1(y).c¯2〈dec(y, k)〉|{enc(s, k)/x})
Using structural equivalence, every closed extended process A can be rewritten to consist
of a substitution and a closed plain process with some restricted names: A ≡ ν.n˜.{M˜upslopex˜}|P ,
where fv(P ) = ∅ , fv(M˜) = ∅ and {n˜} ⊆ fn(M˜).
2.2.2 Internal Reduction
Internal reduction (→) is informally defined as the execution of a process with respect to
control flow and communication. It is formally defined as follows:
Definition 2.8. (Internal reduction→) is the smallest relation on extended processes that is
closed under structural equivalence and application of evaluation satisfying the rules of table
2.5.
Table 2.5 Semantics for processes (2)
COMM c¯〈x〉.P |c(x).Q→ P |Q
THEN if N = N then P else Q→ P
ELSE if L = M then P else Q→ Q
The reflexive and transitive closure of → is written as →∗. To better understand the
substitution and reduction, we provide some examples as follows:
Example 2.9. Consider the process P described in Example 2.7:
P ≡ νs.νk.(c¯1〈enc(s, k)〉)|c1(y).c¯2〈dec(y, k)〉
We have:
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P ≡ νs.νk.νx1. (c¯1〈x1〉)|c1(y).c¯2〈dec(y, k)〉|{enc(s, k)/x1}) (by ALIAS)
νx1.c¯1〈x1〉−−−−−−−→ νs.νk.(c1(y).c¯2〈dec(y, k)〉|{enc(s, k)/x1}) (by COMM)
c1(x1)−−−−→ νs.νk.(c¯2〈dec(x1, k)〉|{enc(s, k)/x1})
≡ νs.νk.νx2. (c¯2〈x2〉|{enc(s, k)/x1}|{dec(x1, k)/x2}) (by SUBST)
νx2.c¯1〈x2〉−−−−−−−→ νs.νk.({enc(s, k)/x1}|{dec(x1, k)/x2}) (by COMM)
Example 2.10.
c¯〈M〉.P |c(x).Q ≡ νx.(c¯〈x〉.P |c(x).Q|{M/x}) (by ALIAS)
→ νx.(P |Q|{M/x}) (by COMM)
≡ νx.(P |Q{M/x}|{M/x}) (by SUBST)
≡ P |Q{M/x}|νx.{M/x} (by restriction rules)
≡ P |Q{M/x} (by ALIAS)
2.3 Equivalences
In addition to secrecy and correspondence properties, there are more complex properties
which enables us to define privacy. Intuitively, two processes are said to be equivalent if
an observer has no way to tell them apart. In order to define observational equivalence, we
could say that processes P and Q are equivalent if they can output on the same channels, no
matter what the context they are placed inside.
2.3.1 Observational Equivalence
We write P ⇓c when P emits a message on the channel c, that is, when P →∗ C[out(c,M);Q]
for some evaluation context C that does not bind c and some process Q.
Definition 2.11. (Observational Equivalence ≈ ) is the largest symmetric relation R on
processes such that PRQ implies:
1. if P ⇓c then Q ⇓c;
2. if P →∗ P ′ then there exists Q′ such that Q→∗ Q′ and P ′RQ′ ;
3. C [P ] R C [Q] for all evaluation contexts C [ ].
⇓c is called a barb on c in the pi calculus, and ≈ is one of the two usual notions of barbed
bisimulation congruence. Intuitively, a context may represent an attacker, and two processes
are observationally equivalent if they cannot be distinguished by any attacker.
Two terms M and N are said to be equal in the frame ϕ, and written as (M = N)ϕ, if
and only if ϕ ≡ νn˜.σ, Mσ = Nσ, and {n˜} ∩ (fn(M) ∪ fn(N)) = ∅ for some names n˜ and
substitution σ.
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2.3.2 Labelled Bisimilarity
The quantification over contexts makes the definition of observational equivalence hard
to use in practice. Therefore, labelled bisimilarity is introduced, which is more suitable for
both manual and automatic reasoning. Labelled bisimilarity relies on an equivalence relation
between frames, called static equivalence, which we define first. Two substitutions may be
seen as equivalent when they behave equivalently when applied to terms. This is shown by
≈S and called static equivalence.
Definition 2.12. (Static equivalence ≈S). Two closed frames ϕ and ψ are statically equiv-
alent, and is written ϕ ≈S ψ, when:
1. dom(ϕ) = dom(ψ)
2. For all terms M and N we have that (M = N)ϕ if and only if (M = N)ψ
We say that two closed extended process are statically equivalent, and denoted by A ≈S B,
when their frames are statically equivalent ϕ(A) ≈S ϕ(B).
This is called static because by using frames we are able to examine only the current state
of the processes and not their dynamic behaviour. Static equivalence captures the static part
of observational equivalence, more precisely they coincide on frames(Abadi et Fournet, 2001).
Example 2.13. Let’s assume the simple signature Σ = {hash, pair, fst, snd} and the equa-
tional theory satisfying fst(pair(x, y) = x and snd(pair(x, y) = y over variables x and y,
where hash, fst and snd are unary functions and pair is a binary function. We could have
the following statements:
• νm.{m/x} ≈S νn.{n/x}; Since they are structurally equivalent.
• νm.{m/x} ≈S νn.{hash(n)/x}
• {m/x} 6≈S {hash(n)/x}; Since the first one satisfies x = m but the second one does
not.
• νs.{pair(s, s)/x} 6≈S νs.{s/x}; Since the first one satisfies pair(fst(x), snd(x)) = x
but the second one does not.
The operational semantics is extended by a labelled operational semantics enabling us to
reason about processes that interact with their environment. Labelled operational semantics
depicted in table 2.6 defines the relation
α−→ where α is a label of the form c(M), c¯〈u〉 or
νu.c¯〈u〉 such that u is either a channel name or a variable of base type. It enables us to
capture the dynamic part of observational equivalence.
The transition A
c(M)−−−→ B means that the process A performs an input of the term M
from the environment on the channel c, and the resulting process is B. If the item is a free
variable x or a free channel d, then the label c¯〈x〉, respectively c¯〈d〉, is used. If the item being
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Table 2.6 Semantics for processes (3)
IN c(x).P
c(M)−−−→ P{M/x}
OUT-ATOM c¯〈u〉.P c¯〈u〉−−→ P
OPEN-ATOM
A
νu.c¯〈u〉−−−−→ A′ u 6= c
νu.A
νu.c¯〈u〉−−−−→ A′
SCOPE
A
α−→ A′
νu.A
α−→ νu.A′ u does not occur in α
PAR
A
α−→ A′ bv(α) ∩ fv(B) = bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅
A|B → αA′|B
STRUCT
A ≡ B B α−→ B′ B′ ≡ A′
A
α−→ A′
output is a restricted channel d, then the label νd.c¯〈d〉 is used. Finally, if the item is a term
M , then the label νx.c¯〈x〉 is used, after replacing the occurrence of the term M by x and
wrapping the process in νx.({M/x}| ).
Definition 2.14. (Labelled bisimilarity ≈L). Labelled bisimilarity is the largest symmetric
relation R on closed extended processes, such that ARB implies:
1. A ≈S B
2. if A→ A′, then B →∗ B′ and A′RB′ for some B′
3. if A
α−→ A′ and fv(α) ⊆ dom(A) and bn(α) ∩ fn(B) = ∅, then B →∗ α−→→∗ B′ and
A′RB′ for some B′.
Clauses 2 and 3 of this definition correspond to classical notions of bisimilarity (Milner,
1999). Clause 1 asserts static equivalence at each step of the bisimulation.
Example 2.15. Consider a handshake protocol between a client C and server S as illustrated
below.
This protocol is started with the request from a client C, then the server S generates a
fresh session key k, and encrypts it using the client’s public key pkC . When C receives this
message he decrypts it using his private key and extracts the session key k. Finally C uses
this key to symmetrically encrypt the secret s and sends the encrypted message to S. Note
that the above notation is an incomplete description and does not cover all specific parts of
the protocol such as the creation of nonces or the various checks, made by participants.
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Figure 2.1 A Sample Protocol
This protocol is defined with respect to the signature Σ = {adec, aenc, sdec, senc}, where
all are binary functions representing the asymmetric and symmetric key encryption. We
define following equation over the variables x and y, in order to model the behaviour of
encryptions:
adec(x, aenc(pk(x), y)) = y
sdec(x, senc(x, y)) = y
The protocol can now be modelled in pi calculus as the process P, defined as follows:
P = ν skS. ν skC ν s.
let pkS = pk(skS) in let pkC = pk(skC) in
(c¯〈pkS〉|c¯〈pkC〉|!S|!C)
S = c(pk).νk.c¯〈aenc(pk, k)〉.
c(x). if sdec(k, x) = tag then Q
C = c(x). let k = adec(skC , x).
c¯〈senc(k, s)〉
In addition to the above used symmetric and asymmetric encryption, the theory allows
us to model different cryptographic primitives such as: pairing, digital signature schemes and
etc, which are briefly presented below.
Ordered Pairing Algebraic data structures such as ordered pairs, tuples, arrays, and lists
appear in several examples. It is not difficult to encode them in the Π-calculus. For example,
the signature Σ may contain the binary function symbol pair and an element can be extracted
using the unary functions fst and snd. pair(x, y) may abbreviated to (x, y) and the fst and
snd equations are as follows:
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fst(pair(x, y)) = x
snd(pair(x, y)) = y
One-way Hash function A one-way hash function is represented as a unary function
symbol h with no equation. The absence of any equational theory associated with it ensures
the one-wayness of h and its collision resistance by the fact that h(x) = h(y) only when
x = y.
Asymmetric encryption An alternative and equivalent formalism for asymmetric encryp-
tion considers two unary constructors pk and sk for generating public and secret keys from
an agent, to capture the notion of constructing a key pair from an agent:
adec(aenc(m, pk(ag)), sk(ag)) = m
Digital signature In a similar manner to asymmetric encryption, digital signatures rely
on a pair of signing keys. In each pair, the secret key serves for computing signatures and
the public key for verifying those signatures. In order to model digital signatures and their
checking, in addition to the unary function symbol pk from asymmetric encryption, the new
binary function symbol sign for constructing signatures, the unary function symbol getmass
that allows the adversary to get the message m from the signature even without having the
key and the binary function checksign to check the signature, and returning m only when the
signature is correct.
getmess(sign(m, k)) = m
checksign(sign(m, k), pk(k)) = m
It is also possible to model signatures that do not reveal the message m, in the Handbook
of Applied Cryptography four different classes of digital signature schemes are defined which
all can be modelled (Menezes et al., 1997).
Exclusive-Or Finally, the XOR function can be modelled by:
xor(xor(x, y), y) = x
xor(xor(x, y), x) = y
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CHAPTER 3
RELATED APPROACHES
In order to formally verify a protocol we first need to build a mathematical model of that
system. Generally two kind of models have been considered in the literature; The Symbolic
model and Computational model.
This chapter surveys the related works in the application of formal methods to the analysis
of untraceability in RFID protocols. We will present works based on the both symbolic and
computational model. We will also compare all definitions in this chapter with our proposed
definitions and will provide a classification for untraceability property in next chapter.
3.1 Works in Symbolic Settings
In symbolic settings, the most closest works to our approach are the models provided by
Arapinis (Arapinis et al., 2009) and Bruso (Bruso´ et al., 2010). They presented approaches for
verifying protocols based on process algebra, written in applied pi calculus. Their approach
models privacy properties as indistinguishability properties using the concept of observational
equivalence in applied pi. Moreover in the symbolic world, Deursen et al. proposed a formal
definition of untraceability in a particular trace model (Van Deursen et al., 2008).
We start with the works that used process algebra in order to model the RFID protocol
and the properties. An RFID protocol is modelled as some processes running concurrently
in parallel. As it is mentioned in the previous chapter, to describe processes in the applied pi
calculus, we define set of names presenting the communication channels and other constants.
A signature Σ which consists of the function symbols which will be used to define terms.
Generally in the symbolic settings the cryptographic primitives are represented by function
symbols and the messages are considered as the terms on these primitives. One can also
describe the equations which hold on terms constructed
3.1.1 Arapinis Model
Arapinis et al. (Arapinis et al., 2009) developed a definition of untraceability in the
applied pi calculus independent of the computational models. They defined two levels of un-
traceability. Strong untraceability that holds if an attacker cannot tell the difference between
an RFID system in which all tags are different and a system in which some tags appear twice.
The weak untraceability holds if an attacker cannot identify two particular runs of a protocol
28
as having involved the same tag. An RFID protocol due to their framework is modelled as a
closed plain process P such that:
P = νn.(DB|!R|!T )
where DB is the database process, R is the reader and T is the process modelling a tag as:
T = νm.init.!main. init is the process of registering the tag to the database DB, and the
main models one session of the tag’s protocol.
They defined their strong untraceability as ensuring that an intruder thinks that each
tag session is initiated by the different tag. It is modelled as a observational equivalence
between process P and P ′ where the process P ′ defined as: P ′ = νn.(DB|!R|!T ′) where
T ′ = νm.init.main and P is said strong untraceable if: P ≈ P ′
In other words the intruder should not be able to tell the difference between the protocol P
and the ideal version of P ′ in which the the tags are allowed to execute themselves at most
once.
On the other hand, their weak untraceability definition ensures that a tag can execute its
protocol multiple times without an intruder being able to link these executions together. This
is modelled using the equivalence of two processes Q and Q′ which in the former T1 and T2
are modelling two different tags such that each one initiated a different session(session1 and
session2), and in the later T
′
1 and T
′
2 are modelling two tags such that both of the mentioned
sessions are initiated from T ′1.
Q = νn.(DB|!R|!T |T1|T2)
Q′ = νn.(DB|!R|!T |T ′1|T ′2)
where:
T1 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession1|mainsession3)
T2 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession2)
T ′1 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession1|mainsession2)
T ′2 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession3)
and Q is said weak untraceable if: Q ≈ Q′ .
3.1.2 Bruso Model
Bruso et al.(Bruso´ et al., 2010) defined untraceability property as equivalences in the
applied pi calculus. They expressed their definition based on unlinkability game presented
by Chatmon (Chatmon et al., 2006).
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In their model, the attacker communicates with a tag through a tag interface, modelled
as a channel. Tag(c) presents a complete tag with interface c. It can perform an unbounded
number of protocol executions. Then Tag(c1, c2) models a single tag (which contains same
id) but with two interfaces c1, c2. These processes are defined by:
Tag(c) = νw.νs.(!P (w, c)|InitSt(w, s)
Tag(c1, c2) = νw.νs.!P (w, c1)|!P (w, c2)|InitSt(w, s)
where: InitSt(w, s) is a process that initializes the tag’s state(Tag’s unique secret) and the
tag main session P (w, c) which is a single tag session that communicates with the rest of the
system using two channels. First a restricted channel w to update the tag’s state and second,
a public channel c used to communicate with the reader. Finally they modelled the complete
RFID system as:
(ReplTag|Reader|DB)
where ReplTag =!νc.Tag(c) models an unbounded number of tags, each with own interface.
They defined untraceability using the following scenario. An attacker communicates with
two interface which could be either the same tag or different ones. Then the attacker must
not be able to distinguish whether two interfaces correspond to the same tag or two different
tags. Regarding their model, a protocol satisfies untraceability iff:
C [Tag(c1, c2)] ≈ C [Tag(c1)|Tag(c2)]
where C is a system context defined as: C [ ] = (ReplTag|Reader|DB).
3.1.3 Deursen’s Trace-based Model
Rather than providing a full description of syntax and semantics of their framework,
we will only present the basic requirements needed for understanding their definition of
untraceability. A full semantics of this framework can be found in (Cremers et Mauw, 2005).
They defined the security protocol by defining the behaviour of the roles(e.g. initiator,
responder) that an agent (e.g. bob, alice) can execute. The agents execute the protocol to
achieve some security goal. While agents pursue their goals, an intruder may try to oppose
them. The adversary is assumed as a standard Dolev-Yao adversary, who may eavesdrop on
any message exchanged between tag and reader, modify or block any message sent from tag
to reader or vice versa, and may inject his own messages making them look like they were
sent by tag or reader.
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A protocol consists of some events. An event is an abstract description of internal events
and external events, executed by an agent. An internal event could be a value assignment, an
equivalent check, a decryption, a type check, etc. An external event is the action of sending
and receiving message.
A role in a security protocol is specified as a sequential list of events executed by an
agent. An agent executes its role description sequentially, waiting at receive events until an
expected input message becomes available which means that an agent ignores unanticipated
messages. For instance we have initiator(i) and responder(r) role in a protocol.
A role performed by an agent(e.g. Tag or Reader) is called a run. Run is an execution
of a role performed by an agent. Within this model a trace t is defined as a sequence of
events comes from numbers of interleaved or uncompleted runs. They defined tR, denoting
the subtraces of t, consisting of the events of the run R which are observable by the adversary.
The i-th such subtrace is denoted by tRi .
They defined untraceability as a trace property of a role in a protocol. Informally, a
protocol is called untraceable if for every trace of the protocol in which two sessions are
initiated from the same agent, there is a trace that is indistinguishable to the adversary,
in which that two sessions are not initiated from the same agent. They used the notion
of reinterpretation (Garcia et al., 2005) to discuss about similarity of message consequently
indistinguishability of traces.
By their definition two traces are indistinguishable to the adversary, if the adversary
cannot see any meaningful difference between the two traces. The trace t is indistinguishable
from a trace t′ if there is a reinterpretation pi such that pi(tRi = t´
R
i ) for all subtraces. Finally
they proposed that untraceability is satisfied if:
∀t∈Traces
∀i 6=j L(tRi , tRj )⇒
∃t´∈Traces (t ∼ t′) ∧ ¬L(tRi , tRj )
where L(tRi , t
R
j ) denotes that two subtraces t
R
i andt
R
j are instantiated from the same agent,
and t ∼ t′ means that the trace t is indistinguishable from the trace t′.
We will transform this trace based definition into applied pi and will compare it with
other definitions of untraceability in next chapter.
3.2 Works in Computational Settings
Untraceability property is firstly defined in computational settings by means of privacy
experiment called games with players: the adversary, against the honest tag and reader in the
literature. Avoine in (Avoine, 2005) were the first to give a definition of untraceability in the
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computational model with a game played between an adversary and a collection of reader and
the tag instances. Some other similar attempts then followed like Juels-Weis model (Juels et
Weis, 2007) and Vaudenay (Vaudenay, 2007). Ouafi and Phan also proposed a privacy model
(Ouafi et Phan, 2008) to demonstrate the notion of untraceability in RFID protocols which
might be considered as an alternative definition of Juels-Weis model with some difference in
the adversary model. All these work are poorly supported by automatic tools.
Before presenting the works based on privacy experiment, we first introduce the RFID
framework used in these games, the adversary model and the concept of untraceability ex-
periment.
RFID System Model. The system is considered as comprising a set of n tags T1, . . . Tn,
and a single reader R. Each tag T is a passive transponder identified by a unique ID. It can
operate just when interrogated by a reader and only for a short time. It has limited memory
and limited computational abilities. The memory of the tags contains a state S, which may
change during the lifetime of the tag. The tag’s ID may or may not be stored in S. Each
tag can perform only basic cryptographic calculations: hash calculations, pseudo random
generation, logical operations and symmetric encryption. Tags can also be corrupted. The
adversary may have the capability to extract secrets and other parts of the internal state
from the tags it chooses. The reader R is a device composed by one or more transceivers
and a backend processing subsystem. The reader’s task is to identify legitimate tags and to
reject all other incoming communication. It is assumed that reader and backend database
are linked by a secure channel. Therefore there are two party protocols, one party a tag
T and the other a reader R with secure access to backend database system. Each party is
a probabilistic interactive Turing machine with an independent source of randomness and
unlimited internal storage.
Adversary. The adversary in computational setting is a probabilistic Turing machine which
controls the communications between all protocol parties (tag and reader) by interacting with
them as defined by the protocol. It is given access to all tags in the system. It can modify
the conversation between any pair, and also initiate and terminate a session as her choice. It
is also able to learn the outputs of the sessions. The characterization of the adversary is done
by specifying the actions that she is allowed to perform, the game she plays and the way she
interacts with the system. Different adversarial model have been proposed in the literature
such as (Avoine, 2005; Juels et Weis, 2007; Vaudenay, 2007; Ouafi et Phan, 2008; Chatmon
et al., 2006) which are different regarding treatment of the adversary’s ability.
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Untraceability Experiment. Untraceability is firstly defined using the game G played
between a malicious adversary A and a collection of tag and reader instances. The idea is that
an RFID protocol may be considered private for some parameter values if no adversary has
a significant advantage in this experiment. The goal of the adversary in these experiments is
to distinguish between two different tags within the limits of its computational power. The
success of A in winning game G and thus breaking the notion of Privacy Priv is quantified
in terms of A’s advantage in distinguishing two cases. This advantage is denoted by AdvAG.
A wins if her advantage is non-negligible and an RFID protocol may be considered private if
the adversary has a negligible advantage in this experiment. In other words if the adversary
cannot distinguish two cases with probability higher than random guessing. It is formally
written as:
AdvAG = P [Correct Guess] ≤ P [Random flip coin] = 12
In order to better understand the computational model, we provide a sample of such
game. Let’s consider the adversary as a Probabilistic Polynomially-bounded Turing Machine
(PPTM), which interacts with RFID tags and readers through following oracles:
• Execute: Models passive attacks. The adversary gets access to the messages exchanged
between honest agents in a protocol session by eavesdropping.
• Send: Models active attacks. The adversary impersonate a reader in a protocol session
and send message to an instance of a tag.
• Corrupt: This query allows the adversary to learn the stored secret of the tag.
• Test: This query does not correspond to any of adversary’s abilities. It allows to define
indistinguishability-based notion of untraceability.
Then the privacy game can be divided into three following phases:
• Learning phase: Adversary is given access to tags T0 and T1 randomly, then she is
able to send any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries of its choice to T0, T1, and the
Reader.
• Challenge phase: Adversary chooses a fresh session to send a Test query. Depending
on a randomly chosen bit b ∈ {0, 1}, A is given a tag from the set {T0, T1}. Then it
continues to make any Execute, Send, and Corrupt queries.
• Guess phase: Adversary outputs a bit b′ ∈ {0, 1} and terminates the game G which
is the guess of b′s value.
The success of A in winning game G and thus breaking the notion of privacy denoted by
AdvPrivA (k) is quantified in terms of A
′s advantage in distinguishing whether she receives T0
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or T1 where k is the security parameter. Now we say that a protocol satisfies untraceability
if the advantage in privacy game is negligible:
AdvAG ≤ 12 + 
Now we presents some related works which defined untraceability property like the above
notion.
3.2.1 Avoine Model
In their model the adversary is a PPTM, which interacts with RFID tags and readers
through following oracles. Assume a tag T , and a reader R which participating in the proto-
col P . They denoted tag instances by piiT , and likely reader by pi
j
R. The oracles are:
• Query(piiT ,m1,m3): Models adversary sending a request m1 to tag, subsequently send-
ing it the message m3 after having received its answer.
• Send(pijR,m2): Models adversary sending the message m2 to reader and receiving its
answer.
• Execute(∗)(piiT , pijR): Models adversary executing an instance of the protocol, obtaining
the messages from both sides.
• Reveal(piiT ): Models adversary obtaining the contents of the memory of the tag which
can be used only once and after that no other queries can not be used.
Within the above adversary model, the authors define two types of untraceability, Exis-
tential and Universal. An existentially untraceable protocol allows the adversary to trace a
tag for a restricted period of time, while a universally untraceable protocol does not. The
difference between existential and universal comes from the manner of the interactions of the
adversary with the tag. Here is a brief scenario of their definition:
• Adversary request for target tag T .
• Adversary interacts with the received tag.
• Adversary request for challenge tags, T1 and T2.
• Adversary interacts with both of the tags.
• Adversary decides which of T1 or T2 is T , then output the guess.
If the adversary’s advantage in guessing the answer is negligible the protocol is said to be
Untraceable.
3.2.2 Vaudenay Model
Vaudenay proposed a more flexible, hierarchical model for untraceability. His model cap-
tures eight classes of adversary capabilities, ranging over four different types of tag corruption
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and two modes of observation. The adversary of his model has the ability to influence all
communications between a tag and the reader, and therefore perform a man-in-the-middle
attack on any tag that is within its range. The above framework takes place over following
eight oracles that the adversary may invoke:
• CreateTag(ID): Create a free tag with unique identifier
• DrawTag(distr) → (vtag): Moves from the set of free tags to drawn tags with the
probability distribution distr. Which vtag denotes a virtual tag reference.
• Free(vtag): Moves the virtual tag back to the set of free tags.
• Launch → pi: Makes the reader launch a new protocol instance.
• SendReader(m,pi) → m′: Sends a message m to a protocol instance pi for the reader
and receive the answer m′ (resp. SendTag(m, vtag) → m´)
• Result(pi) → x: When pi is complete returns 1 and 0 otherwise.
• Corrupt(vtag)→ S: Returns the current state of tag S.
Due to this model, privacy game has two phases. An attack phase that the adversary
start with issuing oracle queries. Then an analysis phase that the adversary receives the table
T that maps every vtag to a real tag ID. Then it outputs either true or false. The adversary
wins if the output is true. For the complete definition of the oracles and the system (see
Vaudenay, 2007).
The adversaries have been divided into different classes, depending on restrictions regard-
ing their use of the above oracles. A weak adversary is never allowed to corrupt a tag, that
is, he may never query the corrupt oracle. A forward private adversary may corrupt a tag
at the end of the attack, a destructive adversary may corrupt a tag at any time, which leads
to the destruction of the tag, that is, the adversary may no longer interact with the tag. A
strong adversary may corrupt a tag at any time without destroying it.
Orthogonal to these four attacker classes there is a notion of wide and narrow adver-
sary corresponded to the two modes of observation. An adversary is called wide if he may
observe whether the protocol ended successfully, and narrow else. Since the four types of
corruption are orthogonal to the narrow/wide separation, eight different adversarial classes
are considered.
3.2.3 Juels-Weis Model
The Juels-Weis model (Juels et Weis, 2007) is based on the notion of indistinguishability.
They provide a slightly stronger definition of untraceability. Untraceability which is called
RFID privacy in their model is defined through a privacy experiment. The adversary selects
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two tags as candidates. After the challenge, one of the candidates is chosen by the adversary.
The simplified version of their defined privacy experiment phases are briefly described below:
1. Setup Phase:
• Generate random keys (key0, . . . , keyn)
• Initialize the reader R with keys
• Create tags and set keys
2. Learning Phase:
• Adversary A communicate with the system
3. Challenge Phase:
• Adversary A select two tags
• Adversary communicate with the system
• Adversary outputs a guess bit
The protocol is said to be private if no adversary has non negligible advantage in success-
fully guessing the tag in the experiment.
Comparing with Vaudenays model it does not have a DrawTag query and instead of
Corrupt query it has a SetKey which returns the current secret of the tag and allows the
adversary to set a new secret. Moreover, in terms of Vaudenay’s model it would considered
as a weak adversary. It is worth mentioning that Vaudenay’s wide-strong adversary is the
strongest of all the adversaries.
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CHAPTER 4
FORMALIZATION AND CLASSIFICATION
In formalizing untraceability, most of the attempts have been relied on computational
models, typically in term of games. These models are poorly supported by automatic tools.
There are also a few definitions of untraceability in symbolic setting, however there is still no
agreement on the exact definition and the strength levels.
Therefore we decided to work in symbolic setting, using process algebra. The main idea of
these approaches are analysis of the similarity of system’s behaviour based on the viewpoint
of an external viewer. Employing a symbolic model helps the explicitness of models and
provides automatic verification, using tools like ProVerif. Nonetheless, in symbolic analysis
we assume perfect cryptography functions which might result in missing attacks, exploiting
weaknesses of the cryptographic primitives.
The goal of this chapter is to collect all definitions of untraceability, introducing a classi-
fication for this property and providing a symbolic model of the privacy games in applied pi
calculus. It also facilitate the process of automatic verification of such protocols.
In section 1, we will classify former privacy games into three different levels and provide
their relations. In section 2, we will propose a general model for RFID identification protocols
in the applied pi calculus. In section 3, three untraceability levels with respect to the men-
tioned privacy game types will be offered. In addition, we will show, formalization of these
levels in the applied pi calculus. Finally, in section 4, we will categorize all the introduced
notions of untraceability.
4.1 Classifying Privacy Games
In this section we would like to classify privacy games in the literature, into three different
types. These games have different steps modelling interaction between the adversary and the
tag. Let’s divide a privacy game into two steps. The first step is the interaction of the
adversary with the tags and the readers. Then the adversary’s knowledge is tested in the
second step. Now, we describe the second steps of the three games in more details, since the
first step of the attacker abilities, is almost the same for all.
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4.1.1 Game Type I
The game scenario is defined as the adversary is given access to two tags T1 and T2,
which could be either same tag or a different one. She can eavesdrop on communications and
query the tags and the readers in the system. Finally, the game ends up, with the adversary,
announcing her guess of whether these tags are the same or not. Untraceability is satisfied
if the adversary cannot distinguish the two cases with the probability higher than a random
guess. Following scenario describes the above model briefly:
• Adversary is given two tags T1 and T2.
• Adversary interacts with both of the tags.
• Adversary decides whether T1 and T2 are equal or not, giving out the guess.
According to the 1st game type, The protocol is untraceable, if AdvATypeI is negligible.
Similar games can be found in the works of (Juels et Weis, 2007; Vaudenay, 2007).
4.1.2 Game Type II
The second game is slightly different compared to the previous one. Such that, the
adversary A must trace some tag T , therefore she is given a tag instead of two, unlike the
previous type. Then the adversary interacts with all tags. Finally, she is given access to a
challenge tag T ′ which must tell whether T ′ is T or not, better than random guessing to win.
It is summarized as following scenario:
• Adversary is given a target tag T .
• Adversary interacts with the received tag.
• Adversary is given a challenge tags, T ′.
• Adversary interacts with all tags.
• Adversary decides whether T ′ is T or not.
The protocol is untraceable according to game type II, if AdvATypeII is negligible. Followed a
similar game of the Chatmon’s work (Chatmon et al., 2006).
4.1.3 Game Type III
This game is the strongest concept, among all untraceability models in the literature.
Chatmon, in (Chatmon et al., 2006), named this game as unlinkability. It is quite the same
as second game type, except that in that one, the adversary already knows T but in this
game, both T and T ′ are challenge tags. Therefore in this scenario the adversary could have
access to any two challenge tags T and T ′, then through interacting with T and T ′, as well as
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all other normal tags and readers, adversary must figure whether it is interacting with same
tags or not. Adversary wins if his score is non negligible. Adversary game can be summarized
as following scenario:
• Adversary A communicate with the system
• Adversary A is given access to two challenge tags T and T ′
• Adversary interacts with the system.
• Adversary outputs a guess bit
Due to game type III, the protocol is said to be untraceable, if AdvATypeIII is negligible. Similar
game can be found in the work of (Chatmon et al., 2006).
4.1.4 Comparison
In this section we compare the aforementioned games with respect to the indistinguisha-
bility experiment, showing that the first type is the weakest and the last is the strongest
among all.
Theorem 4.1. If a protocol respect type III untraceability it will respect type II untraceability.
Proof. Let’s assume protocol P satisfies third type untraceability, therefore we have:
For any two challenge tags T1 and T2, P respects untraceablity thus, the adversary can not
distinguish whether it is interacting with same tags.
We want to prove that P satisfies the second type untraceability. Let T ′ be a given tag, we
should prove that the adversary could not tell whether T ′ is T or not, better than random.
We know that this property is admitted for any T1 and T2, then it is true for T and T
′.
Theorem 4.2. If a protocol respect type II untraceability it will respect type I untraceability.
Proof. Let’s assume protocol P satisfies the second type untraceability, therefore we have:
To trace a tag T , the adversary is given access to a challenge tag T ′ and she is not able to
tell whether T ′ is T or not, better than random guessing.
We want to prove that P satisfies untraceability of the first game. Let T1 and T2 be two
given tags, we should proof that the adversary could not tell whether T1 is T2 or not, better
than random. We know that this property is true for T and any given tag T ′, then it is true
for T1 and T2.
Generally, we can conclude that the third type untraceability is the strongest among the
others, and also the second type implies the first type untraceability, then in brief we have:
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3rd game ⇒ 2nd game ⇒ 1st game
We also comp up with counter examples to show, the above relations can not be true
from the other side. We want to demonstrate 1st game ; 2nd game and 2nd game ; 3rd
game.
Let’s assume a trace of a protocol as depicted in figure 4.1. The shapes are sessions of
different or same tags participating in the protocol run. Each color represents a specific tag.
Therefore, where two shapes have the same color, it means, those two sessions are initiated
by the same tag.
Figure 4.1 A protocol trace
Now consider the traces in figure 4.2. In the right box, you see that if the observer points
at any two given sessions, it could not tell weather they are initiated from the same tag or
not, therefore it can be said, it satisfies 1st type untraceability. But if the observer sees the
output as in the left box, it could see that the first session is initiated from same tag as
the third one, so it can not be true for any session, therefore it does not satisfy 2nd type
untraceability.
Figure 4.2 1st type Untraceability Vs. 2nd type Untraceability
Now Consider the traces in figure 4.3. This example satisfies 2nd type untraceability. By
the definition of the 2nd type game, for the given purple tag, the observer could not find any
other session initiated from the same tag in any other traces. But it does not respect the
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requirement of 3rd type which says that the observer must not link any two session in the
traces of the protocol. In this circumstance, the observer is able to find two sessions which
are initiated from the gray tag in other traces. Therefore it does not respect the third type
game.
Figure 4.3 2nd type Untraceability Vs. 3rd type Untraceability
4.2 Modelling RFID Protocols
Before formalising security properties, we need to show how we model an RFID protocol
in applied pi calculus. Applied pi calculus provides a framework to model security protocols.
It allows us to model the interaction between the agents using communication primitives, as
well as the cryptographic functions using equational theory. Different protocols often have
differences. However, we believe that a large class of RFID protocols can be represented by
processes corresponding to the following structure.
An RFID protocol is a closed plain process
P ≡ νn˜. (Tagσ1| . . . |Tagσn|Reader1| . . . |Readern|A1| . . . |Ak)
An RFID system commonly consist of tags and readers. The Tagσi are the tag processes
which model an unbounded number of tags. Since the link between the reader and the back-
end database is secured and also to simplify the model, we assume that back-end database
is included in the reader. So, we let Readerj be the process modelling the reader and the
back-end database. The Aks are the protocol other authorities such as key distributor and
the n˜ are channel names. We also define an evaluation context C [ ] which is same as P , but
has two holes instead of two of the Tagσis.
The tag model depends on the protocol that is modelled. Typically in an RFID system any
tag has a unique secret idT which differentiates it from other tags and makes it distinguishable
for the reader(back-end database). This secret might be a nonce, or an ID or any other secrets.
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The secret never transmitted in plain text and depending on each protocol it is transmitted
using a hash function, key encryption or logical operations. The tag should be initialised to
the back-end database, since this procedure is done before using tag in any environment, we
consider it as a null process and do not include it our model. We suppose that l ∈ dom(σi)
is a variables which refers to the idT . Since each tag can perform an unbounded number of
protocol execution, we need to consider different tag sessions. So we use si to identify a tag
session.
The adversary is considered as a Dolev-Yao attacker in our model, therefore we do not
need to explicitly define the adversary and we only give the equational theory describing the
intruder. Generally the adversary in our setting has access to any message sent on public
channel. These public channels model the network. Cryptographic primitives modelled by
means of the equational theory.
4.3 Formalizing Untraceability
In this section we will define three levels of untraceability according to three game sce-
narios described above. We will show how the untraceability properties described above in
term of games, can be formalised in our setting. First we illustrate the informal definition of
each property with a simple example then we formally define these concepts in the applied
pi calculus, which makes it possible to automatically check if an RFID protocol respect these
properties.
4.3.1 Low Untraceable
Low untraceability concept is taken from first game type which ensures that the adversary
is not able to infer whether two given sessions s and s′ initiated from the same tag in any
trace. In this case if an intruder point to any two specific sessions in any trace, she cannot
tell whether they have same identities.
Example 4.3. Assume the process P with an unbounded number of tags modelled as P =!T .
Each tag, identified by a distinct identity id, can run unbounded number of sessions, modelled
as T = νid.!(νs.main) where main models single session of a tag. Every session is associated
with a session identifier νs. Now consider two possible branches trA and trB of the process
P which is an equivalent of a trace in trace-based model:
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trA ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id1|mains2id1|!(νs.mainid1)|
mains3id2|!(νs.mainid2)|!T )
trB ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id1|mains3id1|!(νs.mainid1)|
mains2id2|!(νs.mainid2)|!T )
where main
sj
idi
denotes the single session sj of tag idi.
In these traces, there are two different tags with identities id1,id2 and three sessions of
the protocol are executed. To satisfy low untraceability, the adversary must not be able to
distinguish whether two given session s1 and s2 are executed by the same tag (in trA sessions
s1 and s2 are initiated by the tag id1), or by two different tags (in trB sessions s1 and s2 are
initiated by the tags id1 and id2 respectively). It is worth mentioning here that in this level,
the adversary does not see all the outputs of the protocol. If it sees all the outputs may find
other two sessions which may initiated from the same tag, like s1 and s2 in trA and s1 and
s3 in trB which both initiated from tag id1.
Now we say that an RFID protocol respects low untraceability whenever a process where
session s1 initiated from TagA and s2 initiated from TagB, is observationally equivalent to
a process where TagA initiates both s1 and s2. In order to give a reasonable definition of
untraceability, we consider two distinct tag sessions s1 and s2. Formally it is defined as
follows:
Definition 4.4. (Low Untraceability) An RFID protocol respects low untraceability if
C [TagA{s1/s}|TagA{s2/s}] ≈ C [TagA{s1/s}|TagB{s2/s}]
where TagA = Tag{idA/id} and TagB = Tag{idB/id} in which idA and idB denote two
honest tags. Note that we do not consider a separate id for the tags when it is not necessary,
instead we use the tag’s secret keys in order to identify tag’s identity.
The intuition is that if an intruder cannot detect if two given single sessions are initiated
by the same tag or by two different tags, then in general she cannot link between the two
tags which results in tag’s untraceability.
It is classical to formalise untraceability property through some kind of observational
equivalence in a process calculus. This method relies on the two notions introduced in chapter
2, static equivalence ≈S, and labelled bisimilarity ≈L. Static equivalence captures the static
part of observational equivalence and labelled bisimilarity captures the dynamic part. Abadi
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and Fournet in (Abadi et Fournet, 2001) stated that observational equivalence and labelled
bisimilarity coincide: ≈ = ≈L. They also proved that given closed extended processes A,
B and a closed evaluation context C[ ], we have A ≈L B implies C[A] ≈L C[B]. It is very
important, because labelled bisimilarity can be proved instead of observational equivalence
avoiding to have to deal with the universal quantification over evaluation contexts, required
by the observational equivalence.
Furthermore, since the only difference between two processes P and P ′ lies in the tag
processes, It is only required to verify that:
(Tag{idA/id, s1/s}|Tag{idA/id, s2/s}) ≈ (Tag{idA/id, s1/s}|Tag{idB/id, s2/s})
The tool ProVerif enables us to prove such equivalence in presence of an adversary. Note
that the adversary is not modelled explicitly, she is considered as a part of the environment
and the observational equivalence guarantees that no environment will be able to distinguish
the two cases. In our research we benefit from this tool to demonstrate automatic verification
of the proposed properties for some case study protocols. Following two properties also could
be verified in the same way.
4.3.2 Mid Untraceable
This definition is inspired from the game type II. The adversary wants to trace a tag T
with chosen session s, then she is given access to any session s′. In this case the adversary
must not be able to infer whether s′ is initiated from the same tag as s is initiated from.
Example 4.5. Let’s consider the same process in example 4.3, the branches trA, trB and
trC are defined as follows:
trA ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id1|mains2id1|!(νs.mainid1)|
mains3id2|!(νs.mainid2)|!T )
trB ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id2|mains3id2|!(νs.mainid2)|
mains2id1|!(νs.mainid1)|!T )
trC ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id2|mains2id2|!(νs.mainid2)|
mains3id1|!(νs.mainid1)|!T )
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In trA there are two sessions s1 and s2 which instantiated by the tag id1, but in other two
branches trB and trC , you could see that there is only one instantiation of tag id1. Therefore
it satisfies the mid untraceability which requires that for the given session s initiated from
the tag id1 there is no s
′ in other traces which initiated from the tag id1.
Notice that in the above branches of the protocol run, there might be other sessions than
the given session which initiated from the same tag, like s1 and s3 in trB and s1 and s2 in
trC which instantiated from the same tag id2. This shows the reason why we have middle
level of untraceability and it is not the strongest.
To formalize this property, we consider a given session s1 initiated from TagA. We say
that RFID protocol respects mid untraceability whenever a process including s1 and s2 which
is initiated from the same tag as s1 be observationally equivalent with a process including s1
and s′2 which is initiated from a different tag from which s1 is initiated from. Formally it is
defined as follows.
Definition 4.6. (Mid Untraceability) An RFID protocol respects mid untraceability if
C [TagA{s1/s}|TagA] ≈ C [TagA{s1/s}|TagB]
where TagA and TagB defined in the same way as in low untraceability as Tag{idx/id}. The
intuition is that with a given session s1 if an adversary cannot detect that for any second
session, it is executed by the same tag or by different tag, then it can not link between two
execution of tags and results in tag’s untraceability.
4.3.3 High Untraceable
This level of untraceability is a strong notion of untraceability. It is inspired from the
game type III, that the adversary must not be able to infer whether there exist two sessions
in any trace that initiated from the same tag.
The difference between high and mid untraceability comes from the challenge session
that in mid untraceability adversary already knows the challenge session s, but in high
untraceability both s and s′ are challenge sessions.
Example 4.7. Let’s consider the same process in example 4.3, the branches trA and trB are
defined as follows:
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trA ≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id1 |mains2id1|!(νs.mainid1 |
mains3id2|!(νs.mainid2 |!T )
trB ≡ νid1.νid2.νid3.νs1.νs2.νs3.
(mains1id1|!(νs.mainid1|
mains2id2|!(νs.mainid2|
mains3id3|!(νs.mainid3|!T )
In the above example, you could find no session s′ in trB that initiated from the same tag
as session s in trA is initiated from. As you can see in the above traces there must not be
any link between any two sessions to fulfil the high untraceability.
High untraceability is formally defined in the similar way as low untraceability with a
slight difference. In low untraceability, sessions are given as inputs to the model, which
in high untraceability modelled using new operators ν that means that for any sessions
it should be true. We say that an RFID protocol respects high untraceability whenever a
process including two different tags with an unbounded number of sessions, is observationally
equivalent to a process where sessions are initiated from one tag. Formally it is defined as
follows.
Definition 4.8. (High Untraceability) An RFID protocol respects high untraceability if
C [Tag{idA/id}|Tag{idA/id}] ≈ C
[
Tag{idA/id}|Tag{idB/id}
]
The intuition behind the definition is that any sessions of protocol P should look to the
adversary as if it was initiated by a different tag. In other words the adversary can not be
able to infer whether there exist two sessions initiated by the same tag in any trace.
4.4 Classification of Untraceability Definitions
Now we are able to compare between all untraceability notions such as Arapinis, Bruso,
and our proposed properties. In addition to the presented definitions based on process equiv-
alence in applied pi, Deursen in (Van Deursen et al., 2008) defined a model based on trace
equivalence. We briefly present their framework to be able to also relate their notion of
untraceability with ours. In this section we provide the relation between all formal untrace-
ability definitions in the literature. Before comparing the models, since the model proposed
by Deursen is based on traces, we need a transformation from trace-based model to process
algebra. We first provide this transformation using some examples.
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As we presented in related works, Deursen et al. defined their definition in terms of
traces(Van Deursen et al., 2008). In order to compare these two models we need to transform
the trace based model into process algebra. Therefore we start with modelling a protocol.
They defined the security protocol by defining the behaviour of the roles, therefore we
assume a closed plain process P including l roles, defined as follows:
P = νn˜.(R1| . . . |Rl)
where Ri models the ith role of the protocol. Moreover, we consider P such that all channels
occurring in it are ground, and private channels are never sent on any channel.
A role consists of a sequence of events that an agent can execute, So the agents are
instances of the roles. To consider an unbounded number of agents, we put the Ris under
replication, so we will have:
P = νn˜.(!R1| . . . |!Rl)
Now we should consider an unbounded number of sessions for each role. Each role also
should have a session identifier. In addition we consider a distinct identity for each user so
that we would be able to find out whether two sessions are instantiated by same or different
agents. Therefore we could define a role Ri as follows:
Ri = νid.νm˜.!(νs.maini)
where id is user identity, s is session identifier and main is the process models one session of
a role.
Example 4.9. Consider an RFID toy protocol including two roles: Reader R and tag T .
The protocol starts with sending a request from the reader to the tag. Then the tag responds
hello to the reader. The adversary is assumed as a standard Dolev-Yao adversary that has
the full control over the network. This protocol can be modelled by the following closed plain
process:
P = (!R|!T )
R = νid.(νs.c¯〈req〉.c(x))
T = νid.(νs.c(x).c¯〈hello〉)
Within this model, a trace t is defined as a sequence of events coming from numbers of
interleaved or uncompleted runs. They defined tR, denoting the subtraces of t, consisting of
the events of the run R, which are observable by the adversary. The i-th such subtrace is
denoted by tRi . By knowing that the only observable parts by the adversary in a protocol
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run, are the messages sent and received through public channel, we could say that a subtrace
tR represents all the communications that a specific tag does within a protocol run. Then
the subtrace tRi corresponds to a specific session of tR. Moreover, the notion of linkability of
subtraces in their model, denoted by L(tRi , t
R
j ), represents the concept that two sessions are
initiated from the same agent.
To better understand the above trace based model, we illustrate an example of equivalent
of a trace in terms of applied pi calculus.
Example 4.10. Consider the following processes:
P = !T T = νid.!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)
where, P denotes a protocol with an unbounded number of tags and the process T , models
a tag that has a distinct id, indicated by νid. Each tag executes an unbounded number of
sessions, indicated by the bang operator !, and each session involves outputting the message
“hello” on the public channel c. Every session is also associated with a distinct session
identifier, indicated by νs. A possible branch of the process P could be:
P ≡ (!T |νid1.!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|νid2.!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|
νs1.c¯〈hello〉|νs2.c¯〈hello〉)
≡ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.
(!T |!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|
c¯〈hello〉|c¯〈hello〉); Using the rule: A|νu.B ≡ νu.(A|B)
νx.c¯〈x〉−−−−→ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.
(!T |!(νs.c¯〈hello〉|!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|
(c¯〈hello〉|{hello/x})
νy.c¯〈y〉−−−−→ νid1.νid2.νs1.νs2.
(!T |!(νs.c¯〈hello〉|!(νs.c¯〈hello〉)|
({hello/y})
which represents two agents with the identities id1 and id2 executing two sessions. The
sessions may executed by the same agent, or different agents.
Proposition 4.11. If a protocol is low untraceable, it will satisfy untraceability proposed
by Deursen.
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Proof. To compare the definitions of untraceability we have to understand the definition of
untraceability in terms of our language. Deursen defined untraceability as follows:
∀t∈Traces
∀i 6=j L(tRi , tRj )⇒
∃t′∈Traces (t ∼ t′) ∧ ¬L(tRi , tRj )
It is inferred from the above definition that, untraceability is satisfied if for every trace of
the protocol in which, two subtraces are instantiated by the same agent ∀i 6=j L(tRi , tRj ), there
exists another indistinguishable trace (t ∼ t′), in which two subtraces are not instantiated
from the same agent ¬L(tRi , tRj ).
This is similar to our definition of low untraceability with a slight different, both definitions
requires that the observer cannot distinguish whether two given single sessions are initiated
by the same tag or by two different tags. But their definition only requires to exist only one
indistinguishable trace. This makes their definition weaker than ours and we could conclude
that our low untraceability implies Deursen’s untraceability.
Proposition 4.12. A protocol is low untraceable if and only if it is weak untraceable.
Proof. Let’s assume protocol P satisfies low untraceability, therefore by hypothesis we have
the following:
P ≡ Tag{idA/id, s1/s}|Tag{idA/id, s2/s}|A1| . . . |An
≈
P ′ ≡ Tag{idA/id, s1/s}|Tag{idB/id, s2/s}|A1| . . . |An
where P represents the system in which two sessions s1 and s2 are executed by the same tag
(id1); and P
′ represents the system in which session s1 is initiated by the tag id1, respectively
s2 is initiated by tag id2. According to Arapinis’s weak definition, an RFID protocol Q,
modelled as:
Q = νn.(DB|!R|!T |T1|T2)
T1 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession1|mainsession2)
T2 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession3)
must be equivalent to Q′ modelled as:
Q′ = νn.(DB|!R|!T |T ′1|T ′2)
T ′1 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession1|mainsession3)
T ′2 = νm.init.(!main|mainsession2)
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Considering that a session s1 in Tag{s1/s} is modelled using mainsi in Arapinis frame-
work, Tag{idA/id} in our model corresponds to T1 and respectively Tag{idB/id} corresponds
to T2 in Arapinis model. So processes P and Q represent two protocols, both including two
tag processes that refers to the same tag, modelling two distinct sessions initiated by the
same tag. Therefore we have:
P ≡ Q
and respectively for process P ′ and Q′ we could show that P ′ ≡ Q′.
Proposition 4.13. If a protocol is untraceable due to Bruso’s definition, it will satisfy low
untraceability.
Proof. Let’s assume protocol P satisfies Bruso’s untraceability, we have the following equiv-
alence:
P ≡ (R|DB|Tag(c1, c2)) ≈ (R|DB|Tag(c1)|Tag(c2)) ≡ P ′
(R|DB|!mains(c1)|!mains(c2)) (R|DB|!mains1(c1)|!mains2(c2))
where P represents two execution of a same tag, but on a different interfaces where each one
can executes infinitely many sessions; and P ′ represents a system in which two independent
tags executes infinitely many sessions. Note that since processes R and DB models the same
process on both definitions and the only difference is in tag process, they could be considered
as null. Now we have to prove that protocol P satisfies following equivalence relation:
νn.(DB|!R|!T |T1|T2) ≈ νn.(DB|!R|!T |T ′1|T ′2)
T1 ≡ (νs1.mainid1) &T1 ≡ νs2.mainid1) T ′1 ≡ (νs1.mainid1) & T ′2 ≡ (νs2.mainid2)
The main difference between two above models is that, Bruso’s model requires a system
with a tag executing infinitely many sessions in contrast with our model which considers only
single session in the indistinguishability game. Therefore it is trivial that Bruso’s definition
is stronger and implies our definition.
Proposition 4.14. If a protocol is strong untraceable due to Arapinis, it will satisfy our
High untraceability.
Proof. Let’s assume protocol P satisfies Arapinis’s strong untraceability, we have the follow-
ing equivalence:
νn.(DB|!R|!T ) ≈ νn.(DB|!R|!T ′)
νn.(DB|!R|!(!main) νn.(DB|!R|!(main))
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This equivalence requires that the RFID system with unbounded number of tags where each
can execute multiple sessions, be equivalent to one where each tag executes only one session
since the macro presenting tag’s session in process T ′ is not under replication. But our
definition only consider two tags in the indistinguishability game. Therefore it is obvious
that Arapinis definition is stronger. It is worth mentioning that, although their definition
is the strongest notion of the untraceability, real-life protocols can not satisfy this property
since it requires a tag only execute one session.
4.5 Results and Discussions
In this chapter we discussed about all the definitions of the untraceability in the literature
and suggest a new classification for this property in RFID protocols.
In Arapinis model, the strong property requires that the RFID system with unbounded
number of tags where each can execute multiple sessions, be equivalent to one where each
tag executes only one session since the macro presenting tag’s session in process T ′ is not
under replication.
This model suffers from an attack in which the attacker is in the proximity of the tag
and queries the same tag multiple time in a short period, knowing that, it is the same tag.
Assume that T and T ′, pointing the same tag and each has a single session. Within this
model, since a tag interface always corresponds to the same tag, the adversary is not able
to choose the tag which communicating with. The adversary has also the ability to query a
tag several times and might get response from any tag. Regarding their strong property, She
must not be able to distinguish these two tags but their proposed model makes it impossible
to satisfy the definition that has only a single session unless a different definition is given to
the single tag session. This could be a main blind spot of such definition.
On the other hand, Arapinis’s weak untraceability, requires a system in which two ses-
sions are executed by a particular tag, to be equivalent to a system where one of these two
sessions is executed by a different tag. This model is somehow similar to Bruso’s model. In
both models the adversary must not be able to distinguish between a system including two
executions of the same tag and a system including the execution of two independent tags.
But there is a difference in these two model. Bruso’s model requires a system with a tag
executing infinitely many sessions, while Arapanis model, considers only a single session in
the indistinguishability game. This model also does not work properly in state based proto-
cols like the protocol proposed by Ha et al. (Ha et al., 2007), ProVerif verifies the protocol
untraceablility, which could not be true due to the following simple scenario.
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Consider a tag communicating with a reader. Depending on the tag’s current session, two
scenarios could occur on reader side: the reader might complete the run by responding the
tag or it terminates the execution of the protocol by rejecting the tag in the case of getting
an incorrect respond from tag. Assuming that the tag is in its first session(initial state) the
reader cannot verify whether the message sent by the tag has changed during transmission.
Thus, malicious modification of this message does not result in rejection of the tag by the
reader. So the adversary performs a man-in-the-middle attack. She gets a challenge from the
reader and sends it to the tag to obtain a response. Then, she replaces the message, provided
by the tag, with a different value and submit the response to the reader. If the reader rejects
the response, the tag was in the middle of its session and if the reader accepts the response,
the tag was in the initial state. Therefore the adversary gets some information about the tag
which could result in tracing the tag.
In view of aforementioned reasons, we propose definitions for three levels of untraceability.
So we reviewed untraceability definitions based on privacy games and divided them into three
types. Then we proposed three untraceability levels corresponding to each game type with
some examples, to clarify the difference between these levels. In brief we divide untraceability
into the following levels:
• Low Untraceability, as ensuring that the adversary can not be able to distinguish whether
two given sessions in any trace initiated from the same tag or two different tags.
• Mid Untraceability, as ensuring that for a given session, the adversary must not be
able to infer that there exist another session, initiated from the same tag, as the given
session is initiated from.
• High Untraceability, as ensuring that the adversary must not be able to infer whether
there exist two sessions in any trace that initiated from the same tag.
We define these properties using observational equivalence in applied pi calculus, so that
Proverif gives us the ability to verify them. We also present the relationship between our
definitions and the definitions in the literature. Table 4.1 depicts the results of comparison
between the proposed untraceability levels as met by different definitions in the literature.
We will also illustrate some case studies on different RFID protocols from the literature in
the following chapter.
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Table 4.1 Comparison of Untraceability properties
Bruso Unt.
⇓
High untraceability ⇒ Mid untraceability ⇒ Low untraceability
⇑ m
Arapinis Strong Unt. Arapinis weak Unt.
⇓
Deursen Untraceability
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CHAPTER 5
CASE STUDIES
This chapter illustrates how to automatically verify the proposed untraceability property
in RFID protocols. As mentioned by Deursen, it was a problem in such protocols (van
Deursen et Radomirovic, 2009). Many protocols like (Sun et Zhong, 2012; Kim et al., 2007;
Qi et al., 2012; Bassil et al., 2012) have been proposed and has not been automatically verified
yet. In this chapter we cover the protocol proposed by Kim et al (Kim et al., 2007) along
with the protocol presented by Feldhofer (Feldhofer et al., 2004). Our third case study is the
sample protocol used by Arapinis (Arapinis et al., 2009), and the last one which belongs to
the group of hash-based, single step protocols is proposed by Ohkubo et al. (Ohkubo et al.,
2003).
In this chapter, we employ the tool ProVerif(Blanchet et al., 2001) to model our case study
protocols and verify the properties. Before going through the case studies, we briefly introduce
the tool and present how to verify secrecy, correspondence and equivalence properties.
5.1 ProVerif
ProVerif is a fully automatic tool for analysing the security of cryptographic protocols.
It can handle many different cryptographic primitives including symmetric and asymmetric
encryption, digital signature and hash functions. ProVerif is capable of proving reachability
properties, correspondence assertions, and observational equivalence which can be useful
to analysis of secrecy, authentication, privacy and traceability properties. Its architecture
is depicted in Figure 5.1. ProVerif accepts two kinds of input files: Horn clauses and the
Applied Pi calculus. It gives us the ability to automatically prove following properties in order
to analyse security protocols. Recently R. Kuster and T. Truderung (Ku¨sters et Truderung,
2011) proposed a new tool XOR-ProVerif which is a small program, transforms a protocol
using Exclusive-Or mechanism into a protocol in Horn clauses compatible with ProVerif.
Secrecy Intuitively, the secrecy of the term M is preserved in a protocol if it is only known
to participants which are entitled to access it and no adversary can obtain M by substitution
and deduction from output of the protocol. The adversary is formalized as a process running
in parallel with the protocol which outputs M on a public channel after constructing it. If
she cannot construct M , the secrecy is preserved. In ProVerif to test secrecy of the term M
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Figure 5.1 ProVerif Architecture
in the model, the following query is included in the input file before the main process: query
attacker(M). where M is a ground term.
Authentication (Correspondence properties) To reason with correspondence proper-
ties processes are annotated with events, marking important stages reached by the protocol
which do not otherwise affect behaviour. Events are analogous to breakpoints used in soft-
ware development. Correspondence properties are used to represent the relationships between
events that can be expressed in the form ”if an event e has been executed then event e′ has
been previously executed.” Authentication can be captured using correspondence assertions.
For example, recall the handshake protocol authentication property that the client is only
willing to share her secret with the server S; it follows that, if she completes the protocol,
then she believes she has done so with S and hence authentication of S to C should hold. In
contrast, server S is willing to run the protocol with the client who he is willing to, and hence
at the end of the protocol he only expects authentication of C to S to hold, if he believes
C was indeed his interlocutor. Accordingly, the grammar for processes including events are
extended with event e(M1, . . . ,Mn);. The syntax to query a basic correspondence assertion
in ProVerif is:
query x1 : t1, . . . , xn : tn; event(e(M1, . . . ,Mj))→ event (e′(N1, . . . , Nk)).
Observational Equivalence The notion of indistinguishability is a powerful concept which
allows us to reason about complex properties that cannot be expressed as reachability or cor-
respondence properties. Indistinguishability is generally named observational equivalence in
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the formal model. If an agent receives a message or an adversary eavesdrop a message for
which it does not have the decryption key, this message looks just like a random bit string.
Intuitively, two sequences of messages look the same to an agent and the agent understands
the same form both of the messages, these messages are called observational equivalence. In
other words if a message looks like a random bit string to an agent, then the corresponding
message also looks like a random bit string.
Strong secrecy A first class of equivalences that ProVerif can prove is strong secrecy.
Strong secrecy means that the attacker is unable to distinguish a session of the protocol
where a data m has been used from a session where m has been replaced by m′. In other
words, the value of the secret should not affect the observable behavior of the protocol.
Equivalences between processes that differ only by terms ProVerif includes some
queries that enable us to prove the most general class of equivalences where the processes
P and Q have the same structure and differ only in the choice of terms. Intuitively, two
processes P and Q are observationally equivalent, written P ≈ Q, if they can output on
the same channels, no matter what the context they are placed inside. Roughly speaking,
processes P and Q are said to be observationally equivalent when an active adversary cannot
distinguish P from Q where the processes P and Q have the same structure and differ only
in the choice of terms. This is written in ProVerif by a single biprocess that encodes both P
and Q. Such a biprocess uses the construct ”choice[M,M ′]“ to represent the terms that differ
between P and Q. P uses the first component of the choice, M , while Q uses the second one,
M ′.
The most general class of equivalences that ProVerif can prove are equivalences P ≈ Q
In other words if they can output on the same channels, no matter what the context they are
placed inside. Roughly speaking, processes P and Q are said to be observationally equivalent
when an active adversary cannot distinguish P from Q where the processes P and Q have
the same structure and differ only in the choice of terms. These equivalences are written
in ProVerif by a single biprocess that encodes both P and Q. Such a biprocess uses the
construct ”choice[M,M ′]“ to represent the terms that differ between P and Q. P uses the
first component of the choice, M , while Q uses the second one, M ′.
5.2 Feldhofer Protocol
In this section, we study a mutual authentication protocol proposed by Feldhofer et al.
in (Feldhofer et al., 2004). We first present an informal definition of the protocol. Then, we
model it in the applied pi calculus. Deursen in (Van Deursen et al., 2008) proposed that, it
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is untraceable regarding their definition of untraceability. Here we show that, the protocol
neither satisfies Mid and Hight untraceability, nor Bruso’s untraceability. It only satisfies the
Low untraceability property. The protocol is depicted in figure 5.2 using a message sequence
chart.
Figure 5.2 The Feldhofer Mutual Authentication Protocol
5.2.1 Description
The protocol includes a reader, a tag and a key distributor. During the first phase, every
pair of reader, Reader and tag, Tag receives a unique key k. These shared keys are initially
not part of the adversary’s knowledge. The reader initiates the protocol by sending a freshly
generated nonce nr to the tag. The tag generates a nonce nt encrypts the pair (nr, nt) under
the shared key k, and sends it to the reader. The reader decrypts the message using the same
shared key, reverses the order of the two nonces, encrypts the message under the shared key,
and sends it to the tag.
5.2.2 The Model In Applied Pi
The protocol is defined with respect to the signature Σ = {senc, sdec}. Cryptogra-
phy is modelled in a Dolev-Yao style as being perfect. So the cryptographic primitives are
modelled as an equational theory. The encryption function is modelled by the equation:
sdec(senc(m, k), k) = m; where both senc and sdec are binary functions, representing sym-
metric key encryption and decryption. The ProVerif code used to model the protocol is
shown in table 5.4.
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Table 5.1 Feldhofer protocol ProVerif code
(* a generic symmetric encryption function *)
fun senc/2.
reduc sdec(k, senc(k, m)) = m.
(* Key Distributor Process *)
let Key =
new sk;
out(privcR,sk);
out(sk1Ch,sk).
(* Tag Process *)
let Tag =
in(privcT,sk);
in(c,nr);
out(c,senc((nt,nr),sk));
in(c,msg1);
let (ntt,nrr)=sdec(msg1,sk) in
if (ntt=nt) then
if (nrr=nr) then 0.
(* Reader Process *)
let Reader =
in(privcR,sk);
new nr;
out(c,nr)
in(c,msg2)
let(nt,nrr)=sdec(msg2,sk) in
if (nrr=nr) then
out(c,senc((nr,nt),sk)).
(* Main process *)
process new nt; ( Key | Reader |
(let privcT = sk1Ch in let nt = nt2 in Tag) )
In the proposed protocol model, defined processes are, the tag, the reader, the key dis-
tributor and the main process.
Main Process. The main process specifies the parallel combination of the processes and
sets up the private channels that mainly used for key distributions. We model the above
protocol for only one tags and launch a copy of the reader for the tag. To model the untrace-
abilities two tags are needed to be run in parallel, then we launch two copies of the readers,
one for each tag.
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Key Process. Our model includes a dedicated process for generating and distributing
keying material for shared key encryption.
Tag Process. Within this process, first, each tag obtains its secret key from the key process.
The remainder of the specification follows directly the informal description given above. The
statement “let(nt, nrr) = sdec(msg2, sk) in” in this process uses destructor and pattern
matching with type checking to verify that if the first and the second element are the readers’s
and respectively its own nonce.
Reader Process. The reader process also follows the informal description of the reader
mentioned above, after getting its shared key from the key process.
We simulated the secret key sharing through sending message via secret channels. We did
not model tag identities, instead we considered the shared key as tag identifier. In this thesis
the aim of our work is to investigate the untraceability achieved by our modelled protocols.
According to our proposed definition high untraceability holds when it is impossible for an
attacker to distinguish between a system in which two sessions s1 and s2 are initiated from
tagA and a system where s1 is initiated from tagA and s2 is initiated from tagB. In formal
terms, this means proving the equivalence (≈) of the following processes:
P ≡ Key|Reader|Reader|TagA|TagB ≈ Key|Reader|Reader|TagA|Tag′B ≡ P ′
TagA = νsk1.νsk2.Tag{sk1/sk}
TagB = νsk1.νsk2.Tag{sk1/sk}
Tag′B = νsk1.νsk2.Tag{sk2/sk}
Tag = privcT (sk).c(nr).c〈senc((nt, nr), sk)〉.c(msg1)
where P represents the system in which two single sessions are initiated by two different tags
and P’ represents the system in which two single sessions are initiated by the same tag. The
session identifiers coincide with the nonces in our model and the ids represented by the se-
cret keys. The notation Tag{ski/id} indicates the execution of the protocol using the tag idA.
5.2.3 Automatic Verification Results
We first used ProVerif to verify the confidentiality of the secret values, sent through the
protocol. Then we checked the authentication properties by adding required events to the
both beginning and end of the tag and the reader processes as follows:
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Table 5.2 Feldhofer protocol - Correspondence properties
(* Tag Process *)
let Tag =
event beginRparam(tag); in(privcT,sk);
in(c,nr);
out(c,senc((nt,nr),sk));
in(c,msg1);
let (ntt,nrr)=sdec(msg1,sk) in
event beginRfull(tag, nr, nt, sk);
if (ntt=nt) then
if (nrr=nr) then 0;
event endTparam(tag);
event endTfull(tag, nr, nt, sk).
(* Reader Process *)
let Reader =
event beginTparam(reader);
in(privcR,sk);
new nr;
out(c,nr)
in(c,msg2)
let(nt,nrr)=sdec(msg2,sk) in
event beginTfull(reader, nr, nt, sk);
if (nrr=nr) then
event endRparam(reader);
event endRfull(tag, nr, nt, sk);
out(c,senc((nr,nt),sk)).
Table 5.3 Feldhofer protocol - secrecy and correspondence queries
query attacker:nt;
attacker:sk.
query evinj:endTparam(x) ==> evinj:beginTparam(x).
query evinj:endTfull(x1,x2,x3,x4) ==> evinj:beginTfull(x1,x2,x3,x4).
query evinj:endRparam(x) ==> evinj:beginRparam(x).
query evinj:endRfull(x1,x2,x3,x4) ==> evinj:beginRfull(x1,x2,x3,x4).
Then by adding the following queries to the protocol model the ProVerif will check for the
results, to see if they are true or false.
After getting the true results for the above queries, we can say that the secrecy and
mutual authentication properties are satisfied by Feldhofer Protocol. Now in order to check
our untraceability we use choice query to make sure that an adversary cannot distinguish P
from Q where the processes P and Q both have the same structure and differ only in the
second tag’s id.
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The verification results by ProVerif also shows that this protocol which is said to be
untraceable by Deursen, only satisfies our low untraceability definition. This is due to the fact
that in low untraceability the attacker should distinguish the two given session of the protocol
which does not include the complete outputs of the protocol. Because in low untraceability
we only investigate two specified sessions of tags which provided by the main process.
Now, in order to check whether it satisfies Arapinis strong definition we should model the
equivalence between a system in which the protocol executed by each tag at most once, and
a system in which tags can execute the protocol more than once, modelled as follows:
Q = !R|!T ≈ !R|!T = Q′
T = νid.!(νnt.in(c, nr).
out(c, senc((nt, nr), sk)).in(c,msg))
T ′ = νid.νnt.in(c, nr).
out(c, senc((nt, nr), sk)).in(c,msg)
where T and T ′ are tag processes and nt is the random nonce and id is the tag identity which
is modelled by the tag’s secret key. The process T represents a tag with identity id which can
execute the protocol an unbounded number of times, while the process T ′ can execute the
protocol at most once. We modelled the above equivalence using ProVerif. As we expected
the strong untraceability could not be satisfied for this protocol.
Protocol
Untraceability level
Deursen Bruso Weak Low Mid High Strong
Feldhofer 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
Figure 5.3 Arapinis’s Sample Protocol
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5.3 Arapinis Toy Protocol
In this section we model the toy protocol used by Arapinis in (Arapinis et al., 2009) in
order to analyse its untraceability property. The protocol is depicted as a message sequence
chart in Figure 5.3.
5.3.1 Description
Within this sample protocol the reader sends a welcome message to the tag. The tag
responds to reader with its identity Tid paired with a nonce nt, asymmetrically encrypted
with public key k. It is worth mentioning here that this sample protocol does not satisfy
authentication, since it is a sample program.
5.3.2 The Model in Applied Pi
The protocol is defined with respect to the signature Σ = {aenc, adec, pk}. The crypto-
graphic primitives are modelled as an equational theory. The encryption function is modelled
by the equation: adec(aenc(m, pk(skey)), skey) = m; where the unary constructor pk con-
structs a key pair, it takes a private key and returns a public key. aenc and adec are binary
functions representing asymmetric key encryption and decryption. Encryption and decryp-
tion are in a similar manner to symmetric cryptography with a public/private key pair used
instead of a symmetric key. The ProVerif code used to model the protocol is shown in table
5.4
5.3.3 Automatic Verification Results
We modelled different properties of untraceability. We verified all the untraceability
definitions but the strong one.
Protocol
Untraceability level
Deursen Bruso Weak Low Mid High Strong
Arapinis toy prot. 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
5.4 KIM Secure and Private Protocol
In this section we study a protocol proposed by Kim et al. (Kim et al., 2007). This
protocol aims to protect personal privacy and keep the tag untraceable. First we give an
informal definition. The protocol is depicted as a message sequence chart in Figure 5.4.
Then, we model the protocol in the applied pi calculus. Lastly, we show that this protocol is
not private due to our untraceability definitions.
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Table 5.4 Arapinis’s sample protocol
(* a generic asymmetric encryption function *)
fun pk/1.
fun adec/2.
fun aenc/2.
reduc adec(aenc(m, pk(prk)),prk) = m.
(* Key Distributor Process *)
let Key =
new prk;
out(privcR,prk);
out(pubch,pk(prk)).
(* Tag Process *)
let Tag =
in(pubcT,pbk);
in(c,x);
out(c,aenc((nt,id),pbk)).
(* Reader Process *)
let Reader =
in(privcR,sk);
new x;
out(c,x)
in(c,msg).
(* Main process *)
process new id; ( Key | Reader |
(let pubch = pubcR in let id = id in Tag) )
We also demonstrate the man-in-the-middle attack which gives the adversary the knowl-
edge to distinguish between tags. Then we propose a correction on the protocol and show
that the new fixed model satisfies upto high untraceability and not Arapinis’s, strong un-
traceability.
5.4.1 Description
This protocol consists of three phases, identification, initial setup and privacy protection
phase. In the initial phase both the mobile reader and the tag receive a key k from the server.
The protocol starts with the reader challenging the tag with a freshly generated nonce nr.
Upon receiving the request, the tag generates a nonce nt. Then it computes hk(nr) and
responds with ID ⊕ nt and hk(nr)⊕ nt.
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Figure 5.4 The Kim Secure and Private Protocol
5.4.2 The Model in Applied Pi
The algebraic properties of the xor function are not supported by ProVerif. Hence, we
modelled a simplified version as: xor(xor(x, y), y) = x. However, this abstraction gives less
deduction power to the attacker and thus could result in the loss of possible attacks. We use
a signature in which xor(x, y) denotes the simplified xor function and h denotes the keyed
hash function. The keyed hash function is modelled using a binary function without any
equation that represent the one-wayness of the hash function. The ProVerif code used to
model the protocol is shown in table 5.5.
Main Process. The main process generates a new session identifier represented by tag’s
nonce and a tag identifier represented by hash function’s key, to instantiate a copy of a tag
process executing in parallel with the reader process.
Tag Process. In the tag process, first it obtains its secret key. Then as it is mentioned in
the informal description, after receiving the nonce generated by the reader, it sends a message
to the reader.
Reader Process. The reader is willing to run the protocol with any other principal. On
request from a tag, the reader starts the protocol by selecting a fresh nonce nr and outputting
it on the public channel.
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Table 5.5 Kim Protocol ProVerif Code
(* a one-way keyed hash function *)
fun h/2.
(* simplified xor function *)
fun xor/2.
equation xor(xor(x,y),y)=x.
(* Tag Process *)
let Tag =
in(privch,k);
in(c,nr);
out(c,(xor(id,nt),xor(h(nr,k),nt))).
(* Reader Process *)
let Reader =
new nr;
out(c,nr)
in(c,msg).
(* Main process *)
process new sk; new nt1; ( Reader |
(let k = sk in let nt = nt1 in Tag) )
5.4.3 Attack on untraceability
The authors claimed that their protocol provides untraceability, because the tag never
sends the same response twice and it is refreshed by both sides on each session. ProVerif
could not prove the untraceability property of this protocol. We show that the protocol is not
untraceable by providing an algorithm that gives the adversary a non-negligible advantage
of guessing the selected tag.
To attack untraceability, the adversary challenges the tag twice with the same nonce. He
can then calculate the xor of the two parts ID ⊕ nt and hk(nr) ⊕ nt of the responses. This
equation does not depend on nt and it always gives the result of ID ⊕ h(nr, k). Therefore
the adversary twice obtains ID ⊕ h(nr, k), if and only if it was twice the same tag that he
challenged. The attack is depicted in Figure 5.5.
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Figure 5.5 Man-in-the-middle Attack on Kim et al. Protocol
5.4.4 Fixing the Protocol
The previously described protocol problem is based on the fact that the adversary can
guess if she is communicating with the same tag or not, by receiving the same messages
after sending the same nonce twice. The solution for this problems should not require heavy
additional overload for the tag.
Therefore it is feasible to change the message hk(nr)⊕nt to hk(nr)⊕hk(nt). As you could
see, we did not add additional cryptographic capabilities in the tag, but rather use what
already is available.
5.4.5 Automatic Verification Results
We modelled the fixed system in applied pi calculus, first we verified the confidentiality
of the secret values like ID, k and nt. After that we went through the mutual authentication
properties. ProVerif verified both secrecy and authentication properties. This part is done in
the similar was as the first case study by adding begin and end events, in both tag and reader
processes. Then by querying the correspondence property mutual authentication property
could be concluded.
After satisfying the correctness of the protocol, we analysed the untraceability properties.
Finally, it is observed that, all untraceability properties, but the strong, are successfully
verified on fixed model of this protocol.
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Protocol
Untraceability level
Deursen Bruso Weak Low Mid High Strong
Kim 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kim modified 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
5.5 OSK protocol
OSK, the protocol presented by Ohkubo et al. (Ohkubo et al., 2003), belongs to the
class of single step protocols. In this class of protocols the tag is activated by the reader
without receiving any message. Then the tag generate the message due to its current state,
which mostly contains a fresh nonce and sends it to the reader. This is the only message sent
within this protocol. After that the tag updates its current state and the session ends. This
class of protocols mostly used in the supply chain systems. As it is mentioned in the chapter
three, there is a security scheme for tags based on one-way hash functions. It only requires
implementing a hash function on the tag and the key management is done on the back-end.
This makes the tags light and cheap for mass production.
The problem here, is raised because the tags may still function as object identifiers while
in the locked state by using the ID for database lookups. Since the ID acts as identifier, it
allows the adversary to take advantage of the tag functionality and track individuals. This
shows the importance of verifying the untraceability for this kind of protocols.
5.5.1 Description
This protocol is defined with respect to the signature Σ = {f, g} where both f and g are
unary one-way hash functions. It is depicted in Figure 5.6.
Figure 5.6 The OSK protocol
It assumes that a tag can compute two distinct one-way hash functions f and g. Each tag
initially stores a secret id s which is shared with the backend database. The hash function h
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is used to update the secret at each run of the protocol while g is used to encrypt the output;
the tag sends g(si), where si is its current identifier and then updates its secret si+1 = h(si).
5.5.2 The model in Applied Pi
In this protocol, similar to all other single step protocols, the readers are completely
passive, in contrast with above presented protocols. So, in this protocol for an RFID system
we could set Reader as a null process. The tag also does not need any interaction with other
participants to update its secret, and it is modelled with a simple hash function. Therefore
we have the following simple RFID system:
Table 5.6 OSK Protocol ProVerif Code
(* two one-way hash functions *)
fun h/1.
fun g/1.
(* Tag Process *)
let Tag =
out(c,g(s));
let s = h(s) in 0.
(* Reader Process *)
let Reader =
in(c,msg).
(* Main process *)
process ( Reader | Tag )
5.5.3 Automatic Verification Result
ProVerif proved that all untraceability properties are satisfied by OSK protocol. Actually
we modelled different single step protocols and we could not find any that does not satisfy
untraceability properties. We find single step protocols the only group which could achieve
Arapinis Strong untraceability, and this is due to the fact that these protocols only send one
message by the public channel and each time the secret changes, which makes it impossible
for the attacker to get any knowledge of messages or agents secrets.
Protocol
Untraceability level
Deursen Bruso Weak Low Mid High Strong
OSK 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
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5.6 Results and Discussions
Table 5.7 depicts the results of our case studies in brief.
Table 5.7 Untraceability results of case studies
Protocol
Untraceability level
Deursen Bruso Weak Low Mid High Strong
Feldhofer 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
Arapinis toy prot. 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
Kim 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
Kim modified 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
OSK 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
• As shown in the table 5.7, weak and low untraceability indicate the same outputs for
all studied protocols, corresponding to the discussion held in section 4.4.
• Although we showed the difference between mid and high untraceability in an exam-
ple, we could not find any protocol, among the existing protocols, which satisfies mid
untraceability but not high untraceability. Consequently in the above results, it is seen
that any protocol, satisfies mid untraceability, also satisfies high untraceability.
• The result reveals that, the OSK is the only protocol which satisfies strong untrace-
ability. Not satisfying the strong untraceability by other protocols than OSK, is due to
the fact that, the adversary observes that there are two tags which executed multiple
sessions each. Since it violates the case that each tag executes itself at most once the
actual protocols can be distinguished from the ideal version. This does not let the
ProVerif to satisfy strong untraceability, however, this information does not allow the
tag to be really traced.
• ProVerif showed that, the untraceability property is not satisfied by the Kim’s protocol,
and the attack algorithm is provided. We modified the protocol and demonstrated that
the modified version meets all our untraceability levels.
Table 5.8 Comparing time to verify high untraceability
Protocol
Time (ms)
Bruso UNT High UNT
OSK 4 4
Kim modified version 15476 7867
ProVerif also enables us to measure the time that takes to get the results. The results
showed that our definition works even more efficient in the manner of time among others.
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Although the time is not an important factor comparing to the properties. As we measured,
in simple protocols the difference is not too much, but in more complicated protocols you
could see an impressive difference. The table 5.8 depicts a comparison between our high
untraceability with a weaker model proposed by Bruso, which you could see it works faster.
We could not compare our high definition with Arapinis strong definition since we could not
find a suitable protocol which verifies both properties.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Technically, in this thesis, we improved the capabilities of the formal verification of RFID
identification protocols, by defining explicit definition of security properties, presenting a pro-
cedure for the evaluation of security properties. This final chapter presents a brief conclusion
of our work and the possibilities for the future work.
6.1 Review of the Research
This work provided the design of a secure and a private identification protocols, improv-
ing the evaluation of existing schemes by using proper verification. We classified different
strengths of untraceability, based on three presented game types. Subsequently, a formal
methodology is suggested to verify such property.
After collecting all the privacy games in the literature, it is concluded that the difference
between definitions, is derived from the indistinguishability games used in the definition of
untraceability. Then we divided this property into three levels related to the type of games. It
is assumed as the first classification of untraceability, where it covers all previous definitions.
In brief we divided untraceability into following levels:
• Low Untraceability as ensuring that the adversary can not be able to distinguish whether
two given sessions in any trace initiated from the same tag or two different tags.
• Mid Untraceability as ensuring that for a given session the adversary must not be able
to infer that there exist another session initiated from the same tag as the given session
is initiated from.
• High Untraceability as ensuring that the adversary must not be able to infer whether
there exist two sessions in any trace that initiated from the same tag.
We compared our levels of untraceability with Arapinis’s weak and strong definition. We
depicted that the weak untraceability and our low untraceability are coincides. We also
showed that the strong definition can only be used for a small group of protocols, and be-
cause of some assumptions it is impossible to satisfy this property for most protocols. We
also transformed the trace-based model of untraceability, presented by Deursen, into pro-
cesses and demonstrated that it is weaker than our notion of low untraceability. Finally we
proved that Bruso’s definition of untraceability implies our low untraceability.
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In order to specification and verification, we have formalized an RFID protocol model and
three untraceability levels, using applied pi calculus. It is a process calculus which is able
to model security protocols by having a rich term algebra, value passing, function symbols
and a equational theory to model the cryptographic operations. Applied pi calculus enables
us to model both reachability, correspondence and observational equivalence properties. We
formalized untraceability as some kind of observational equivalence.
We have demonstrated our results in some case study protocols. We modelled four differ-
ent protocols in the literature, where three of them was chosen among the previously analysed
protocols and one of them has not been automatically analysed before. We demonstrated
that, the protocol proposed by Feldhofer, which is assumed to be untraceable can only satisfy
our notion of low untraceability. We modelled another protocol which as authors claimed, it
supposed to be secure and private. After analysing this protocol, we got a trace which resulted
in tracing a tag by the adversary. Then by providing the attack algorithm on untraceability
property, we proposed a fix for this protocol. We have used the existing cryptographic ca-
pabilities of the tag in order to not any additional overhead to the tag. We showed that the
modified protocol satisfies all our notions of untraceability. Finally we modelled a protocol
belonging to the group of single step protocols, where we found the only group that satisfies
all of the mentioned untraceability levels including Arapinis strong definition.
Extensive case studies show the effectiveness and efficiency of our taxonomy in verifying
untraceability of RFID protocols. The results also showed that our definitions works more
efficient in the manner of time, among the others. Moreover, our approach and framework
are generic and could be adapted into different systems.
The principle limitation of our approach is derived from the algebraic properties of logical
operations used in some RFID protocols, which do not allow the verifier tools to model such
systems. There are some investigation to illustrate how to convert these sort of operators in a
language, processed by some tools. However, they can solely verify authentication properties
and can not be used in analysis of the observational equivalence.
6.2 Possible Improvements and Future Work
Concerning future possible research related to verification of security properties, it seems
promising to model other privacy properties like forward or backward security using the same
model presented for untraceability.
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Another potential area for future work is enriching ProVerif to consider logical operators
such as Exclusive-Or, or to develop an interface to convert the protocol including logical
operators into applied pi. It is worth mentioning that there is an add-on for proverif which
enables us to verify secrecy and correspondence properties of protocols with logical operators
but it is not able to analyse the observational equivalence. Therefore since logical operators
acts the main role in light identification protocols, it will be very useful to automatize the
verification procedure.
Although untraceability properties are mostly used in the context of RFID systems, they
are issues for any protocol, which can be used with a mobile device, so it is possible to
extend it to other protocols like VANET and etc. So there is also a possibility of study of
untraceability in these environments.
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